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A SYNTHESIS OF THE LAW OF MISREPRESENTATION
By FOWLER V. HARPER* and MARY COATE MIcNEELYf

S

I. INTRODUCTION

important contributions have been made to the subject
of responsibility for misrepresentation, materially aiding in an
understanding of the various fragments of the common law which
govern the subject. It is believed that they throw sufficient light
on the entire subject to make some effort at synthesis profitable.
They suggest the possibility of attempting to formulate a major
issue in misrepresentation cases, and investigating the applicability of the several segments of the law to the issue as thus framed.
Among these contributions is that of Professor Smitlh who,
in discussing the question of liability for the negligent use of
language, contended that liability should be imposed upon a negligence basis whenever the defendant has offered the misinformation gratuitously, and when it was the sort of misstatement likely
to cause substantial pecuniary loss. This general argument has
found favor with the courts of some states.2 Some years later
Professor Williston3 considered the case of Derry v. Pcek4 in
relation to the English rules of implied warranty of a vendor's
title to a chattel, the warranty of quality, the liability of an agent
who had misrepresented his authority, estoppel by representation,
and the rule established by a large number of American cases imiposing liability in certain situations for an honest and non-negliEVERAL

*Professor of Law, Indiana University.
-;Research Assistant, Indiana University.
'Smith, Liability for Negligent Language, (1900)

14 Harv. L. Rev. 184.

2Cunningham v. Pease House F. Co., (1908) 74 N. H. 435, 69 Ati. 1M0;
Weston v. Brown, (1925) 82 N. H. 157, 131 Ati. 141.
3Williston, Liability for Honest Misrepresentation, (1911)

Rev. 415.

4(1889) 14 A. C. 337.

24 Harv. L
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gent misrepresentation although the action were in form one of deceit. He contended that there is an inconsistency among these various
rules resulting entirely from the earlier forms of pleading at
common law, and that the toleration of this inconsistency today
is a reproach to modern legal science. He suggested as an "harmonious doctrine" a uniform rule of liability for misrepresentation.
Professor Bohlen' took issue with this thesis, and justified the
variations of liability in three types of misrepresentations, his position being that the doctrine of Derry v. Peek,' requiring scienter,
should be confined to actions for deceit; that liability for negligent
misrepresentations be recognized as deriving from the general
principles and considerations of the law of negligence; that liability
for innocent (that is, unconscious and non-negligent) misrepresentations, be treated as an application or extension of the law of
warranty. In 1930, Professor Carpenter," reviewing the positions
taken by these three preceding writers, carried forward the general contention made by Bohlen, that negligent misstatements
should be governed by rules analogous to those applicable in actions for harm negligently caused to person or tangible property,
and vigorously answered Williston's argument for a uniform
rule of liability in all cases of misrepresentation. He contended,
in substance, that in certain situations justice requires the absolute liability for which Williston argued, whereas in others, fairness seems to require liability only when the misstatement was
negligently or consciously made.
Professor Weisiger,8 in 1930, suggested that the three types of
liability and the rules governing them were necessary adequately
to govern the variety of relations disclosed in the misrepresentation cases. The manifold form and character of business relations,
the interests involved in these transactions, and the positions of
the parties present situations which require a graduation of severity
in legal responsibility for misstatements.
"In conclusion," says he, "it is believed that three types of
liability for misrepresentation ought to be recognized. The nature
and relative value of the interests, the plaintiff's opportunity for
protecting his interest, the exigencies of business practice and
5Bohlen, Misrepresentations as Deceit, Negligence or, Warranty, (1929)
42 Harv. L. Rev. 735.
6(1889) 14 A. C. 337.
7Carpenter, Responsibility for Intentional, Negligent and Innocent Misrepresentation, (1930) 24 Il1. L. Rev. 749.
8
Weisiger, The Bases of Liability for Misrepresentation, (1930) 24 I1.
L. Rev. 866.
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social customs and the relations existing between the parties should
determine in which class a case will fall."
Dean Green, 10 placing his usual emphasis upon the agencies for
the administration of legal precepts, pointed out the elasticity
afforded by the various doctrinal devices thus available. He seems
content to leave the matter in this fluid state.
"Perhaps something can be done by way of formulating clearer
hypotheses, but with types of transactions demanding a range from
the strictest warranty to mere good faith or reasonable belief, or
even less, it would be impossible to make any general formula
which would cover them all. On the other hand, a series of
formulas for different types of cases as variant as human conduct itself would necessarily be confusing and soon come to
appear contradictory.""With a consideration of these various treatments of the fragmentary law of misrepresentation in the background, it is believed
that it may be possible to uncover some ideation and common
judicial psychology underlying the apparently inconsistent and
variant cases on misrepresentation.
II. A

RATIONALE

OF LIABILITY

FOR MISREPRESENTATION

Legal liability is normally imposed only when the interests
of one party are so invaded that good social engineering requires
governmental protection. In cases involving misrepresentation,
the plaintiff who has entered into a business transaction with the
defendant or a third person has failed to obtain the advantages
which, from the defendant's misstatements, lie has been led to
expect. Whether the invasion of this interest is actionable requires an estimate of what, under the circumstances, the plaintiff
was justified in expecting-not only as to the profitable or nonprofitable results of the transaction, but as to the accuracy and
basis of the defendant's statements.
A person in a business transaction cannot have insurance of
profit unless he enters into an express agreement therefor. ie
must take some business risks. "Business risks," however, are of
two kinds: those which arise from the economics of the transaction, and those which result from ignorance of facts of economic
9
Weisiger, The Bases of Liability for .Misrepresentation, (1930) 24 IMl.
L. Rev. 866.
'OGreen, Deceit, (1930) 16 Va. L. Rev. 749; Green, Judge and jury

(1930) 280.

" Green, Deceit (1930)

Judge and Jury (1930) 280.

16 Va. L. Rev. 749, at 761, note 10; Green,
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significance and inability to ascertain them with accuracy. As
to the first type of risks, the entrepreneur must rely upon judgment-his own or someone else's; as to the latter, he must rely
upon knowledge-his own or someone else's. When he relies
upon another's statements, whether of judgment or fact, and the
enterprise is not satisfactory in result, a legal problem may arise
as to whether he was justified as a practical matter in such reliance. The propriety of the plaintiff's expectation involves the
business ethics and mores and those general canons of fairness
and decency which affect that standard of judgment which, for
want of a better name, we call common sense. The interests of
a person are protected only when his conduct so conforms to
accepted social standards of propriety and common sense that he
is regarded as entitled to legal protection. The conduct of the
person who suffers loss sometimes is compared to the conduct of
the person who causes it, and this comparison is made in the light
of the relationship between the parties. Usually one party cannot
recover from another unless he has exercised at least as much
care for his own welfare as the other party has exercised for it,
although in some situations the moral culpability of the defendant
may offset the plaintiff's lack of self-protective conduct.12
The present problems may be stated by positing the following
question: What does common sense, in view of the accepted
business and social mores of the community, entitle one person to
expect from another who purports to furnish information or make
12While there are frequent intimations in the law of misrepresentation
of the major issue of policy as it is presented in sonic particular aspect,
there is no systematic treatment of the entire matter, and little or no effort
at coordination of the various technicalities of the law in which this issue is
involved. Perhaps the most suggestive synthesis is the treatment of the
American Law Institute where a number of rules are arranged under the
subheading "Justifiable Reliance." (Restatement of Torts, Tentative Draft
No. 13, Secs. 613-621). Here the Reporter has treated the rules pertaining
to materiality, misrepresentation by statements of opinion, the plaintiff's duty
of investigation, statements of law, and one aspect of the effect of a misrepresentation of intention. The rules governing scienter, however, as well
as the rules governing negligent misrepresentations are not included under
this head. The rules governing liability for innocent misrepresentation are
not included at all in the Restatement, because, no doubt, of the reporter's
views as expressed elsewhere (Bohlen, Misrepresentations as Deceit, Negligence or Warranty, (1929) 42 Harv. L. Rev. 735) that these rules are not
properly to be classified as rules of the law of Torts. Moreover, the linitations of the Restatement project obviously preclude any formulation of the
policy reflected in the legal propositions stated, or any correlation of the effects of these propositions in making effective a consistent program of policy.
In other words, since the Restatement is primarily a project in the rational
science of law, it does not make explicit the social and economic policies
latent in legal formulae.
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statements for his gudiance in a business transaction? To paraphrase the issue, how far is it desirable and practicable for the
law to permit reliance by one party upon another's statements?
In so formulating the issue, both ethical factors and considerations
of administrative workability are blended. It is believed that this
question of practicably justifiable reliance is susceptible of four
distinct answers, varying as the relationship between the parties
discloses different inarticulated assumptions as the basis for their
conduct.
First, there are situations in which a person endowed with
ordinary intelligence will seldom be expected to rely in any respect
whatever upon a statement made by another, although such statement apparently is intended to influence his action in a business or
commercial transaction. Consequently, he is not practicably justified in relying thereon. He may not rely upon the truth or validity
of the statement, nor upon the care or competence of the other to
insure its accuracy, nor, indeed, even upon the honesty of the person who makes it. This rule may contain low ethical implications,
but it most certainly conforms with common sense, as reflected
in popular psychology. Therefore. it may be said to conform to
the law and popular morality, although it may not conform either
to ideal justice orto ethics. It represents one of the not infrequent
situations in which the practical limitations of law and morality
preclude a coincidence of their rules with those of justice and
ethics.
Among other reasons for this divergence is the practical difficulty of determining the exact facts of the situation and the
correspondnig opportunity for fraud and injustice. Difficulty of
administration requires a workable rule. It is not often that one
person is not entitled to rely at least upon the sincerity and
honesty of another who makes a representation in a business
transaction. In the few situations in which this is the case, usually
"puffing" or "trade talk," consisting of misrepresentations of
opinion by an adverse party, 3 it is so unlikely that any person
would, in fact, rely upon the misrepresentation that the law
'-Statements regarded as mere expressions of pure opinion are generally
non-actionable, even though consciously false, i.e., insincere. Stokes Y.
Stokes, (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) 48 S. W. (2d) 724: Belka v. Allen. (1909)
82 Vt. 45, 74 AtI. 91; Stacey v. Robinson, (1914) 184 Mo. App. 54, 168
S. W. 261; Shine v. Dodge, (1932) 130 Me. 440. 157 Atil. 318; Saxby V.
Southern Land Co., (1909) 109 Va. 196, 63 S. E. 423; Cash Reg. Co. v.
Townsend, (1905) 137 N. C. 652, 50 S. . 306, 70 L. R. A. 349. See
Restatement of Torts, Tentative Draft No. 13, sec. 618. See infra, Part VII.
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ignores the very rare case in which someone may actually have
done so. 4 Common experience suggests so strongly that no sensible person would believe such a representation, that a particular
plaintiff will not be permitted to convict himself of such folly.
Moreover, there is the attitude, which is not confined to the law of
misrepresentation, that a person may be so great a fool that the
law cannot protect him even from a knave. Then, too, there are
situations in which there is little to be gained by the reliance of
one party on statements made by the other. Indeed, as a practical
matter, it is commonly believed that such reliance should be discouraged, the mores requiring independence of judgment on the
part of both sides to the transaction.
In the second place, there are situations in which the relationship of the parties is such that one person in the exercise of that
minimum amount of caution which the. law requires is practicably
justified in relying only upon the sincerity and honesty of the
person who makes the representations to him. H-e should not expect
any particular degree of competence or care from the other, and
a fortiori he may not rely upon the other's infallibility. ie may
expect honesty but no more; he must take the information for
what it is worth, and this requires that he assume the risk not
only of its accuracy, but of the lack of care and caution on the
part of the other to assure such accuracy.
In still other situations, relationships exist which are generally
accepted in the community as carrying definite obligations to
employ reasonable care to avoid misleading others. In such cases,
each party may properly assume that the other will not make
representations which he has no reasonable ground to believe to
4
1 A similar situation is presented in the case of liability for innocent

misrepresentations where one, though not the only factor that apparently has
influenced the courts is the fact that such cases disclose either a type of
situation in which the defendant would normally know the facts, or a case in
which he has asserted complete knowledge. In either case, the difficulty of determining his exact state of mind and the consequent opportunity for injustice
in part induces the courts, as a practical matter of administration, to ignore
the exceptional case. This is indicated by such formulae as "the defendant
will be presumed to know" the facts which he misrepresented. The question of actual fraud becomes exceedingly subtle in many respects, with a corresponding increase in difficulty of determination. The psychological gradations may be almost imperceptible between knowledge of falsity, knowledge
of ignorance of truth or falsity, and doubt as to ignorance thereof; that
is, certainty of falsity, certainty of uncertainty, and uncertainty of uncertainty.
In other words, a person may consciously make a false statement or lie
may know that he doesn't know the truth of what he states, or lie actually
may not know whether he knows. While an introspective analysis may be
carried to this point, it is obviously impracticable to expect its legal application to the state of another person's mind.
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be true. These assumptions are justifiable as conforming to the
ethics of business practice. Here the law quite properly requires
the parties to make good the tacit assumptions upon which they
deal. Each party is entitled to expect from the other honesty,
ordinary care, and reasonable competence in furnishing the information exchanged concerning the subject matter of the relationship.
Finally, there are situations in which action is commonly taken
in business negotiations in reliance upon the assumed existence
of certain facts. Business proceeds not upon the assumption that
representations are merely honestly and cautiously made, but that
they are true. These are situations in which the party making the
representations is in a position which gives him exclusive access
to the facts, or the manner of giving the information constitutes
such an assumption of complete knowledge that the psychological
effect upon the other is calculated to divert that self-protective
investigation which would normally be made. Business would
be greatly hampered, and human nature ignored were the law
not to lend its sanction to enforce the prevailing assumptions of
accuracy thus made. This attitude may be the result of the
growth of commerce and industry from its former individualistic
basis to its present vast and impersonal form.
"With the acceleration of business generally," says Dean
Green," "as well as the standardization of the various types of
transactions the factors which control judgment demand more and
more certainty and precision in sales and credit transactions."
It is believed that the bulk of the case material will indicate
that courts have proceeded as if they were following some such
analysis as the one suggested. The issues frequently are clouded
by narrow doctrinal discussions, but the application or misapplication of formulae usually has led to proper results. In some
instances, however, the case law seems to defy clarification. It
sometimes happens that courts impose liability in one situation
although. the misinformation was innocently given, but require
scienter in another case which seems indistinguishable from the
former. In such cases there is often apparent no consciousness
of inconsistency. In others, on the apparent assumption that the
explanation is entirely satisfactory, the discrepancies are attributed
to the character of the action, thus confirming Maitland's observation that although the forms of action are dead, their ghosts
haunt us still.
15Green, Deceit, (1930)
(1930) 280.

16 Va. L. Rev. 749; Green, Judge and Jury
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It is also to be observed that the problem of the extent of
liability seems susceptible of the same rationalization. Here
again, the various relationships of the parties reveal the interests
which the law seeks to protect and the loss against which they are
to be protected. Thus, in some situations it is the purpose of the
law to insure to one of the parties the benefits which he is justified
in expecting from the transaction which he is negotiating. In
others, although the law seeks to protect a party against certain
losses resulting from his justifiable reliance upon representations
made by the other, there is no particular policy which requires
assurance of the advantage which he had hoped to gain. Here
again, whether the one or the other policy should be made effective
will depend upon community standards of what the parties in
the particular relationship in question are justified in expecting
from each other.
III.

"FACT"

AND "OPINION"

The problem presented, in the foregoing discussion assumes
the giving of misinformation which has proved harmful to the
plaintiff in a business transaction. Implicit in this assumption is
the problem of what constitutes misinformation. The defendant
has communicated some idea, ordinarily by written or spoken
language, upon which the plaintiff has relied to his damage. It is
necessary to consider what is regarded as "misinformation" or
"misrepresentation" for which there may be legal responsibility.
Every legal problem involving liability for the use of written
or spoken language is plagued by the distinction between statements of fact and statements of opinion. This is true not only in
the law of misrepresentation, but as well in defamation and disparagement, where "falsity" is an essential condition to liability.
The policy of the law in these fields is to prevent harm which
results when one person misleads another. "Truth," therefore, is
a complete defense in all such actions. 6 There are, to be sure,
1-This is the common law rule in defamation, modified only by statutes in
a few states, the constitutions in others, and judicial decision in one, making
something more than truth, usually "good motives" or "justifiable ends," also
necessary to complete the defense. See Florida, constitution, sec. 13; Illinois.
constitution, art. II, sec 4; Nevada, constitution, art. I. sec. 9; Rhode Island
General Laws, (1923( sec. 4915; Maine, Revised Statutes, (1930) ch. 96, sec.
47; Massachusetts, General Laws, (1921) ch. 231. sec. 29; Kansas. constitution, art. I, sec. 11; Nebraska, Compiled Statutes, (1929) secs. 20-849; Wvoming, constitution, art. I, sec. 20; Pennsylvania. Statutes, (1929) sec. 13757;
Delaware, Revised Code (1915) sec. 4218. In New Hampshire, Hutchins v.
Page, (1909) 75 N. H. 215, 72 At. 689.
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important deviations of policy which reflect reactions to the type
of situation in which the defendant has given the misinformation
and the purpose for which it presumably was given. For instance,
in actions for defamation, the burden of proving the truth of the
defamatory matter is upon the defendant,' 7 whereas in actions
for disparagementib and misrepresentation" the burden is upon
the plaintiff.
It is to be noted that in misrepresentation, the defendant has
misled the plaintiff himself, whereas in defamation he has misled a
third person to the plaintiff's loss. Thus, in the case of misrepresentation, the plaintiff complains because he himself has been
induced to enter into some commercial transaction by his reliance
upon the misstatements which the defendant has made. In defamation, however, he complains because some third person has
believed or is presumed to have believed the defendant's misstatements about him, and has been induced or is presumed to have
been induced -0 to act in reliance thereon to the plaintiff's loss. In
the former case, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant's statements were false; in the latter case, the defendant must prove that
his statements were true. In the former case, the plaintiff has
had, or may have had, some opportunity to protect himself ; action
on his part, although induced by mistake, was at least voluntary.
In the latter case, the plaintiff has, indeed, been helpless. Since
his loss results in no way from any action taken on his part, he
has not even had the opportunity of detecting the falsity of the
harmful language. This difference may well account for stricter
requirements for recovery in the former case than in the latter.
17 Palmer v. Adams, (1894) 137 Ind. 72, 36 N. E. 695; Age-Herald
Pub. Co. v. Waterman, (1919) 202 Ala. 605, 81 So. 621; Mann v. Bulgin,
(1921) 34 Idaho 714, 203 Pac. 463; Rhynas v. Adkinson, (1916) 178 Iowa
287, 159 N. W. 877; Spencer v. Minnick, (1914) 41 Okla. 613, 139 Pac. 130.
lSAllis-Chalmers Co. v. Lowry, (1927) 124 Kan. 566, 261 Pac. 828;
Brinson v. Carter, (1922) 29 Ga. App. 159, 113 S. E. 820; Hastings v.
Gites Co., (1889) 51 Hun (N.Y.) 364; Fant v. Sullivan, (Tex. Civ. App.
1912) 152 S. W. 515; Long v. Rucker, (1912) 166 Mo. App. 572, 149 S. W.
1051.
' 9 Youngs v. Advance-Rumely Thresher Co., (1921) 215 Mich. 682, 184
N. W. 535; Hill v. Reifsnider, (1877) 46 'Md. 555; Bowden v. Bowden,
(1874) 75 Ill. 143; Edmunds v. Ninemires, (1925) 2 Iowa 805, 204 N. W.
219; London Bank v. Lempriere, (1873) L. R. 4 P. C. 572.
2 This rule appears in the formula that if the defamatory language is
a libel or is slander per se, damages need not be proved. Haywvard v.
Maroney, (1912) 86 Conn. 261, 85 AtI. 279; Price v. Clapp, (1907) 119
Tenn. 425, 105 S. W. 864; Reilly v. Curtiss, (1912) 83 N. J. L. 77. 84
AtI. 199; Moore v. Maxey, (1910) 152 Ill. App. 647; Fields v. Bynum.
(1911) 156 N. C. 413. 72 S. E. 449; Childers v. San Jose PubI. Co., (1894)
105 Cal. 284, 38 Pac. 903.
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Here again, the deep-rooted individualism of Anglo-American
people finds expression in the common law. A man's ability to
take care of himself gives significance in law to his opportunity to
do so. The difference in the rules governing burden of proof in
these two actions constitutes but one aspect of a liability which is
far stricter for defamation than for misrepresentation.
While this consideration is pertinent to an action for defamation as compared with an action for misrepresentation, it will not
serve to explain the similarity between the rules governing the
burden of proof in actions for disparagement and misrepresentation. Justification for the rule in actions for disparagement is
implied, however, in the policy which in a subtle way makes necessary the rule concerning burden of proof. This policy is a fundamental one in the law of torts, namely, to require as a condition
to shifting a loss from one to another, that the claimant establish
the existence of his loss. Thus, a plaintiff, complaining of a
tortious invasion of his interests by the defendant, is required to
establish not only the existence of his interest, but the fact of its
invasion by the defendant.21 In the case of disparagement of
title, it is the plaintiff's property interest that is alleged to have
been invaded. Accordingly, he must establish the existence of
such property interest. 2 To do so, however, is to establish the
falsity of the defendant's denial of his property interest. The
requirement that the defendant in such an action has the burden
of proof on the issue of the truth of his disparaging publication
would obviously be inconsistent with the rule that the plaintiff has
the burden of establishing the existence of the property interest
which he claims has been disparaged. -In the case of defamation,
it is unnecessary that the plaintiff prove the existence of his interest. The interest which he claims to have been invaded is the
interest in his reputation. Obviously he has a reputation. The
law indulges the presumption that it is better than as represented
by the defendant. The reasons which justify the burden of proof
on the issue of falsity in actions for defamation thus do not prevail in the action for disparagement.
32This rule appears in the various "conditions" or "elements" of a
"cause of action" in tort which the plaintiff is required to establish.
22
StoVall v. Texas Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) 262-S. W. 152; Rittenhouse v. Johnson, (1932) 161 Okla. 169, 17 (2d) 457.
It has been held that if the title which the plaintiff claims to have been
disparaged is doubtful, he cannot recover. Millman v. Pratt, (1824) 2
B. & C. 486; Thompson v. White, (1886) 70 Cal. 135, 11 Pac. 564; Welsbach Light Co. v. American Lamp Co., (S.D. N.Y. 1899) 99 Fed. 501.
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Since truth, therefore, constitutes a basis for immunity in
misrepresentation, as well as in other actions for loss caused by
language, there is immediate embarrassment when the test of
truth or falsity is applied to statements which purport to represent
the opinion or judgment of the person who uses the language.
Statements of fact are subject to such a test because the statement is subject to verification. Facts may be ascertained with
some considerable objectivity. The existence of the facts is independent of the person who makes the statement of fact. On the
other hand, such ascertainment has much less application to expressions of opinion, mostly subjective to the person who so
expresses himself. The difference is that between a statement of
objective facts and a subjective interpretation of those facts.
Whether the person actually holds the opinion which he professes
is, of course, a question of fact. The validity of the opinion itself,
however, is a question of judgment which is less amenable to
objective criteria. There is, however, some objectivity to judgment
or opinion, in the sense that it embodies a guide to action based
upon a prediction as to future developments. Thus, a "good"
bargain implies a prediction as to a combination of future events
that suggests the proposed transaction as an economically desirable one. So, too, a "good" book, play or picture represents a
judgment, in part, at least, that its object will be regarded as conforming to certain standards of literary or artistic criticism.
This subject recently has received limited treatment in defamation under the caption of "fair comment." It is recognized that
a statement which is an expression of opinion may be as defamatory as a statement of fact concerning another's conduct.? The
defense of "fair comment," however, is restricted to the defamatory expression of an opinion concerning that which is regarded
as the subject of "public interest." 2-4 Limited treatment is also
accorded this problem in the field of disparagement. "
23

A defamatory communication may consist of a statement of opinion
based upon facts known or assumed by both parties to the communication.
Restatement
of Torts, Tentative Draft No. 12, sec. 1008.
24
1n the Restatement of Torts, the phrase "public concern" is substituted
for the more usual phrase "public interest," presumably on the theory that
the public is often "interested" in matters which are none of its "concern."
What is to be included in the classification of public interest has been
worked out by a technique of inclusion and exclusion. Matters currently
held to be a proper subject of public interest include the works of authors,
painters, entertainers and performers, musicians, scientists, and educators.
Dibdin v. Swan, (1793) 1 Esp. 28; Tabart v. Tipper, (1808) 1 Campb.
350; McQuire v. Western "orning News, [19031 2 K. B. 100; Thompson
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The method of treatment of these problems in the law of
misrepresentation is charged with several subtle complications.
v. Shackell, (1828) M. & M. 187; Henwood v. Harrison, (1872) L. R. 7 C.
P. 606.
So too, the official conduct of public officers is a legitimate subject of
public interest. Harwood v. Astley, (1804) 1 Bos. & P. N. R. 47; Seymour
v. Butterworth, (1862) 3 F. & F. 372; Montgomery v. New Era Publ. Co.,
(1910) 229 Pa. St. 165, 78 Atl. 85; Bearce v. Bass, (1896) 88 Me. 521, 34
Ati. 411; Cook v. Pulitzer Publ. Co., (1912) 241 Mo. 326, 145 S. W. 480;
Grell v. Hoard, (1931) 206 Wis. 187, 239 N. W. 428.
Included, also, are persons who, though not professionally engaged in
any public activity, occasionally participate in public affairs or sponsor
public causes or movements, or otherwise so submit their activities for public
appraisal that they are not permitted to object when the verdict is unfavorable. Campbell v. Spottiswoode, (1863) 3 B. & S. 769; Henwood v.
Harrison, (1872) L. R. 7 C. P. 606; Dakhyl v. Labouchere, [1908] 2 K. B.
325; Flanagan v. Nicholson Publ. Co., (1915) 137 La. 588, 68 So. 964.
This, however, leaves a wide area of what may be called purely private
conduct which may be adversely criticized, and which is outside the scope
of the principle of fair comment. Some test other than the usual one of
"falsity" is necessary to determine whether the expression of a defamatory
opinion in such situations is actionable. "On the other hand, a statement
may be a characterization of the person about whom it is made which expresses the maker's unfavorable judgment upon undisclosed facts of the
other. In such a case, the maker must show the existence of facts which
justify the terms in which he has described the person of whom lie spoke."
Restatement of Torts, Tentative Draft No. 13, sec. 1024A, Comment b.
"If the defamatory matter consists of a statement of defamatory fact
and disparaging comment based thereon, the truth of the facts carries with
it a privilege to make such comment thereon as a reasonable man might
make. If the comment may be understood as implying the existence of
other facts sufficient to justify it, and if it be so understood. proof of the
stated facts is not a defense." Restatement of Torts, Tentative Draft No.
13, sec. 1024A. Comment h. This comment is based upon and supported by
Morrison v. Harmer, (1837) 3 Bing. N. C. 759; Walker v. Brogden. (1865)
19 C. B. (N.S.) 65. If the comment "infers a new fact, the defendant
must abide by that inference of fact," although "it would be extravagant to
say that, in cases of libel, every comment upon facts requires a justification."
Denman, C. 3., in Cooper v. Lawson, (1838) 8 AId. & E. 746, 753. See
the discussion by the writer in Harper. Privileged Defamation, (1936)
22 Va. L. Rev. 642, 655 ff.
2SNo action is available to one whose property is disparaged by an unfavorable comparison with similar property of a competitor, proviled thle
competitor is the defendant. White v. Mellin, [1895] A. C. 154: Hubbuck
v. Wilkinson, [1899] 1 Q. B. 86; Johnson v. Hitchcock, (1818) 15 Johns.
(N.Y). 183; Nonpareil Cork Mfg. Co. v. Keasbey & Mattison Co. (E.D. Pa.
1901) 108 Fed. 721; National Ref. Co. v. Benzo Fuel Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir.
1927) 20 F. (2d) 763, 55 A. L.R. 406.
The privilege here is absolute, whereas in an action for defamation the
defense of fair comment is met by proof that the defendant was insincere
in the expression of defamatory opinion. The competitor who slanders his
rival's goods is protected by a privilege which is not defeated by proof that
the unfavorable comparison did not represent the defendant's true opinion.
but this defense in disparagement is a narrow one, and is not available to
persons who express a disparaging judgment of another's goods when the
element of competition is not present. There seem to be no standards developed in the cases for disparaging opinions by non-competitors.
The English law carefully distinguishes a statement of opinion which
connotes "positive" rather than mere "comparative" defects. See Cundy v.
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First of all, account must be taken of the very important difference as to statements which are in form expressions of opinion,
but which" in a practical sense are statements of fact. This is
always the case when an opinion is expressed upon facts which are
unknown to the recipient. Since an opinion is a judgment or an
appraisal of certain facts, it cannot exist apart from the facts
thus characterized. Therefore, unless the facts interpreted are
stated or otherwise known, they must be supplied by implication. 8
It is for this reason that in every case in which the facts upon
which the opinion is based are unknown, the opinion is logically
an implication of facts which would make the opinion reasonably
appropriate thereto.
Thus, many cases of misrepresentation by opinion are treated
by the courts as statements of fact to which the test of truth or
falsity is applicable. The opinion is "true" if the facts upon
which it is based are such as to make it a proper or justifiable
characterization thereof. This treatment is consistent with that
employed in the cases dealing with fair comment in actions for
defamation, where it is repeatedly held that the defense of fair
comment is applicable only when the facts upon which the comment is based are stated or otherwise known to the recipient.2
YIn such cases, the comment is readily distinguishable from the
facts, and if the statement of fact is true or privileged, the comment is privileged criticism.2 s Because the subject thereof is a
matter of public interest as to which public policy encourages the
free expression of opinion,2 9 the comment is privileged.30 It is
Lerwill & Pike, (1908) 99 L. T. 273; Hubbuck v. Wilkinson [18991 1 Q.
B. 86, with which compare Western, etc., Co. v. Lawes & Co., (1874)
L. R. 9 Exch. 218. See also, Bower, Actionable Defamation, (1908) art.
61, (2).
26"In a case where the facts are equally well knowvn to both parties,
what one of them says to the other is frequently nothing but an expression
of opinion .... But if the facts are not equally known to both sides, then
a statement of opinion by the one who knows the facts best involves very
often a statement of a material fact, for he impliedly states that he knows
facts which justify his opinions." Bowen, L. J., in Smith v. Land and House
Prop.27 Co., (1884) L. R. 28 Ch. D. 7.
Thomas v. Bradbury, Agnew & Co., [1906] 2 K. B. 627; Merivale v.
Carson, (1888) 20 Q. B. D. 275; Popham v. Pickburn, (1862) 7 H. &
N. 891; Hubbard v. Allyn, (1908) 200 Mass. 166, 86 N. E.356; Cooper v.
Stone, (1840) 24 Wend. (N.Y.) 434; Bee Publ. Co. v.Shields, (1903) 68
Neb.2 750, 94 N. W. 1029.
sFor a defamer to have immunity, however, the statement of fact must
be such as not to make the publisher liable, i.e.. it must be nondefamatory,
true or privileged.
29As Lord Ellenborough observed, in Carr v. Hood, (1808)
at nisi
prius, a case involving literary criticism (reported in a note to Tabert v.
Tripper, (1808) 1 Camp. 350). "The critic does a great service to the
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necessary only that it represent the defendant's actual opinion.
An opinion not based on stated or known facts, however, carries
an implication of supporting facts and is not privileged as criticism.
Proof of the truth of the implied facts is required.
In cases of misrepresentation, also, opinion based upon stated
or known or obvious facts is treated as pure opinion. The test of
reasonableness and sincerity is the standard by which its actionable character is determined, depending upon the relation of the
parties and what they are justified in expecting by way of opinion.
There is, of course, even in such a case, the implication that the
opinion thus expressed is the speaker's actual judgment, and to
this extent is a statement of fact. If the opinion is insincere,
that is, if it does not represent the speaker's actual view, it may
properly be regarded as a misrepresentation of the "condition
of a man's mind" and, therefore, a misrepresentation of fact.
Whether such a misrepresentation of the condition of a man's
mind is actionable, however, depends upon whether the condition
of his mind is "material," which, in turn, depends upon whether
the other party to the transaction is justified in attaching sufficient
importance thereto to govern his conduct in a business transaction
accordingly. If the opinion is sincere and thus truly represents
the judgment of the speaker, there is a misrepresentation of fact
in no sense. If, however, the other party is so situated with
reference to the speaker as to justify reliance upon the reasonableness of the opinion, an action for negligence will lie if it represents an unreasonable mistake in judgment on the facts. 3' On the
other hand, where the defendant's opinion is given without knowledge on the part of the recipient of its factual basis, it requires
treatment as a statement of facts sufficient to justify the opinion
and the standard of truth or falsity is pertinent.
Statements concerning law are peculiarly susceptible to this
analysis. These are sometimes treated as representations of law,
sometimes as representations of fact. If the statement announces
a legal conclusion upon known facts, it is a representation of law,
and necessarily a statement of opinion, for it can have no meaning other than that a court will render a decision on the known
facts which conforms to the conclusion stated. This is pure
opinion, and is treated as such. The other party may rely upon
public, who writes down any vapid or useless publication; such as ought
never to have appeared. He checks the dissemination of bad taste, and
prevents people from wasting both their time and money upon trash."
3
OMerivale v. Carson, (1888) 20 Q. B. D. 275, per Lord Esher, M. R.
3
'See infra, p. 986.
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this to the same, but to no greater extent than upon any other
opinion upon known or readily available facts. 32 If, however, the
cards are not all on the table-if the facts upon which the legal
conclusion is predicated are not known to the other party, the
statement is more than a mere matter of judgment. Mr. Justice
Holmes, in discussing this problem, observed that "certain words,
such as 'ownership,' 'marriage,' 'settlement,' etc., import both a
conclusion of law and facts justifying it, so that when asserted
without explanation of what the facts relied on are, they assert
the existence of facts sufficient to justify the conclusion."33
Jessel, M. R., in Eaglesfield v. Marquis of Londondcrry,3'
approaching the problem from the other end, reaches an analogous
result.
"A misrepresentation of law," says he, "is this: when you
state the facts and state a conclusion of law, so as to distinguish
between facts and law. The man who knows the fact is taken to
know the law ;3' but when you state that as a fact which no doubt
involves, as most facts do, a conclusion of law, that is still a statement of fact and not a statement of law.... There is not a single

fact connected with personal status that does not, more or less, involve a question of law. If you state that a man is the eldest
son of a marriage, you state a question of law, because you must
know that there has been a valid marriage, and that that man was
the first born son after the marriage, or in some countries, before.
Therefore, to state it is not a representation of fact seems to
arise from a confusion of ideas.
"It is not the less a fact because that fact involves some knowledge or relation of law. There is hardly any fact which does not
involve it. If you state that a man is in possession of an estate of
£10,000 a year, the notion of possession is a legal notion, and
involves knowledge of law; nor can any other fact in connection
with pr6perty be stated which does not involve such knowledge
of law. To state that a man is entitled to £10,000 Consols
involves all sorts of law."
On the basis of this analysis, an assertion of title or other
legal right without an explanation of the factual basis for the
conclusion may properly be treated as a statement of fact-an
32

See infra, p. 993.
Alton v. First Nat'l Bank, (1892) 157 Mass. 341, 343. 32 N. E. 228.
34 Am. St. Rep. 285, 18 L. R. A. 144.
34(1876) L. R. 4 Ch. D. 693, 702-703.
35
This familiar proposition is misleading. As stated by the Massachusetts court, in holding liable a defendant who had dishonestly made a
statement of law to one who knew the facts, "This presumption means
simply that ignorance of law is no excuse." Jekshewitz v. Growald. (1929)
265 Mass. 413, 164 N. E. 609, quoting from Witherington v. Eldredge.
(1928) 264 Mass. 166, 162 N. E. 300.
33

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

opinion implying facts which will make it "true," that is, facts
to support the title or right asserted. If such facts do not exist,
there is a misrepresentation of fact. Whether such a misrepresentation is actionable will depend upon whether the relations between
the parties were such as to justify reliance upon the complete
accuracy of the statement, the reasonableness and competency of
the opinion on the existing facts, or only on the honesty and
sincerity of the party who made the statement. On the other
hand, the statement of a legal conclusion upon known facts may
be treated as a mere expression of judgment or opinion. Such an
opinion, if honest and reasonable, is never actionable merely
because it turns out to be inaccurate, unless there is an express
contract of warranty. Whether an incompetent and erroneous
opinion is actionable and whether a dishonest, though otherwise
reasonable one is actionable if erroneous, depends upon whether
the relations between the parties justify the plaintiff in expecting
competency or honesty therein, in which respect, the principles
of liability are identical with those which govern other expressions
of opinion.
In all fields of law in which the question of the actionable
character of written or spoken language is involved, analysis is
rendered difficult because these problems are almost invariably
treated as problems of "truth" or "falsity." "Falsity" is thus
used in three distinct senses: First, a discrepancy between a statement of existing fact capable of demonstration and the facts thus
represented. This meaning is applicable to statements implying
fact as well as express statements of specific fact. Second, statements which constitute a mere appraisal of known or readily
available facts. The statement is "true" if the unknown facts
turn out to be such as to "justify" the interpretation placed upon
them by the opinion, that is, if the opinion is an accurate one.
Third, a statement of opinion even upon known facts which, while
incapable of present demonstration, is capable of complete verification in the future. The statement is true if the opinion turns
out to be an accurate forecast of future fact. It remains to
ascertain the treatment which these various types of statement
receive in the technicalities of rules of the law of misrepresentation
and the social policy which these rules reflect.
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IV.

SITUATIONS IN

WHICH

PLAINTIFF

IS ENTITLED TO RELY

UPON THE EXISTENCE OF FACTS AS REPRESENTED, OR UPON
THE VALIDITY OF OPINION OR COMMENT AS A
GUIDE TO CONDUCT.

Where it is deemed desirable social policy to fortify a pre-

vailing business practice with legal coercion and to confirm the
tacit assumptions made by the parties, there is liability for misrepresentation, however innocently made. One giving information
for the guidance of another in a business transaction of this sort
must know whereof he speaks. Mlany cases of this type disclose
a capacity on the part of the defendant for perfect accuracy of
statement. He is in a position to know. Conversely, the recipient
of the communication is seldom in a position readily to discover
the. facts or to confirm them as stated by the other. In other
cases, although the defendant may not be in a position which
affords a special opportunity for knowledge, he has made the
representations in manner and form so positive as to convey an
impression of complete personal knowledge, that is, knowledge
beyond peradventure of doubt. Here it is not so much the opportunity for complete knowledge as the assumption of it that induces
and justifies utter reliance.
When a person makes an unqualified statement, he thereby
implies certainty. When he states it with emphasis upon the
certainty of his knowledge, that is, when he makes express what
otherwise is only implied, the psychological effect is notoriously
much more pronounced, and reliance upon the existence of the
facts thus stated, or upon an adequate factual basis for the opinion
so expressed is more likely to be induced. The recipient in these
cases relies not only upon the honesty and competence of the
person who makes the statement, but upon the truth of the facts
stated or implied in the opinion. Business is often conducted
upon this basis. Business ethics justify the other's complete reliance upon the accuracy of the information imparted, that is, upon
the certain existence of the facts as expressly or impliedly
represented. So, too, does the law. The speaker acts at his
peril. He must guarantee the truth of the information which he
gives. Measured by such a standard, decisions are to be found
in many states which testify to the uniformity of this result.3'
36
Exchange Bank v. Gaitskill, (1896) 18 Ky. L. Rep. 532, 37 S. W.
160 (misrepresentation by vendor as to financial condition of company. inducing investment therein) ; Hindman v. First Nat'l Bank. (C.C.A. 6th Cir.
1902) 112 Fed. 931 (writ of cert. denied in (1902) 186 U. S. 483, 22
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Nor is it an adequate objection that the ideal reasonably prudent and cautious business man would not rely implicitly upon
and be guided by such representations. The justifiability of
reliance is to be determined largely by what the preponderant mass
of men in fact do in such situations. Recent developments in the
economic life of the nation, followed, as they have been, by current legislative trends directed toward the protection of the public
in such transactions, bear witness to what actually happens. In
nineteenth century law, greater stress was laid upon the plaintiff's
self-protective duty than upon the defendant's duty of accuracy
and, in many situations, than upon his duty of honesty 7 "Caveat
emptor" was a rule of wide application, embodying therein a general
Sup. Ct. 493, 46 L. Ed. 1261) (same) ; Mears v. Accomac Banking Co.,
(1933) 160 Va. 311, 168 S. E. 740 (same) ; Laney-Payne Farm Loan Co. v.
Greenhaw, (1928) 177 Ark. 589, 9 S. W. (2d) 19 (same); Drake v. -lolbrook, (1902) 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1941, 66 S. W. 512 (vendor misrepresented
price at which stock was selling on the market) ; Thompson v. Walker,
(1931) 253 Mich. 126, 234 N. W. 144 (same); Owens v. Waterhouse,
(1929) 225 App. Div. 582, 233 N. Y. S. 535 (same); Burke v. Pardey,
(1928) 125 Or. 245, 266 Pac. 626 (same) ; Trust Co. of Norfolk v. Fletcher,
(1929) 57 Va. 868, 148 S. E. 785 (same); Gunderson v. Havana-Clyde Min.
Co., (1911) 22 N. D. 329, 133 N. W. 554; Nash v. Minnesota Title Ins. &
Trust Co., (1895) 163 Mass. 574, 40 N. E. 1039; Purdy v. Underwood,
(1918) 87 Or. 56, 169 Pac. 536 (vendor misrepresented number of acres in
tract sold to plaintiff); Freeman v. Harbaugh Co., (1911) 114 Minn. 283,
130 N. W. 1110 (assignors of notes stated that makers were financially reliable) ; Braley v. Powers, (1898) 92 Me. 203, 42 Atd. 362 (inventor of
machine induced plaintiff to invest by misrep-esenting ability of machine);
Pellette v. Mann Auto Co., (1924) 16 Kan. 16, 225 Pac. 1067 (vendor misrepresented that car was latest model) ; Chatham Furnace Co. v. Moffat,
(1888) 147 Mass. 403, 18 N. E. 168, 9 Am. St. Rep. 727 (vendor of
mineral lease misrepresented quantity of ore in mine) ; Bullitt v. Farrar,
(1889) 42 Minn. 8, 43 N. AV. 566 (agent of vendor misrepresented that lot
was no more than seven feet below street grade in front) ; Palmer v. Goldberg, (1906) 178 Wis. 103, 107 N. W. 478 (agent misrepresented that purchaser's credit was good) ; Kuehl v. Parmenter, (1923) 195 Iowa 497, 192
N. W. 429 (agent made misrepresentation as to the affairs of the company,
inducing purchase) ; Whitehurst v. Life Ins. Co., (1908) 149 N. C. 273, 62
S. E. 1067 (insurance salesman misrepresented type of policy inducing
plantiff to take out insurance) ; Church v. Wickwire, (1931) 231 App. Div.
249, 247 N. Y. S. 100 (false statements in prospectus induced plaintiff to
buy mortgage bonds) ; Edwards v. Sergi, (1934) 137 Cal. App. 369, 30 P.
(2d) 541 (agent misrepresented boundary line) ; Anchor Lbr. Corp. v.
Manufacturers' Trust Co., (1934) 242 App. Div. 656, 272 N. Y. S. 610
(bank
37 made misrepresentations as to the account of a depositor).
"But in actions on the case for deceit, founded upon false affirmations,
there has always existed the exception that naked assertions, though known
to be false, are not the ground of action, as between vendor and vendee;
and in regard to affirmations and representations respecting real estate, the
maxim of caveat emptor has ever been held to apply. When, therefore, a
vendor of real estate affirms to the vendee that his estate is worth so much,
that he gave so much for it, that he has been offered so much for it, or
has refused such a sum for it; such assertions, though known by him to
be false, and though uttered with a view to deceive are not actionable."
Medbury v. Watson, (1843) 6 Metc. (Mass.) 246, 39 Am. Dec. 726.
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attitude of laissez-faire with regard to private business transactions.35 It was up to the plaintiff to look after himself and if
he were overreached by his adversary, he was merely the loser in
a business deal, and had only himself to blame for a bad bargain.
A failure to exercise reasonable business caution was a defense in
an action for deceit, and reliance even upon the honesty of the
adverse party to the transaction constituted a lack of ordinary
business caution2 9
This attitude, however, has been so far modified that not
only is the plaintiff's neglect to follow reasonable business practice
and to take ordinary precautions not fatal to an action based upon
the defendant's deliberate fraud, 0 but it is not always a complete
38

See Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, (1931) 4Q Yale
L. J. 1133. "In penning a declaration of independence for the individual
Adam Smith voiced the advanced thought of his day; his argument, in
justification, that each person, in aiming only at his own advantage, 'is led
by an invisible hand to promote an end which is no part of his intention' won
a growing approval. The age of natural law of revolt against authority,
of laissez-faire was emerging."
"Not until the nineteenth century, did judges discover that caveat emptor
sharpened wits, taught self-reliance, made a man-an economic man-out of
the buyer, and served well its two masters, business and justice."
39MacKenzie v. Seeberger, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1896) 76 Fed. 108; Banta
v. Palmer, (1868) 47 Ill. 99; Boles v. Merrill, (1899) 173 Mass. 491, 53
N. E. 894; Bishop v. Small, (1874) 63 Me. 12; Beare v. Wright, (1905)
14 N. D. 26, 103 N. W. 632; Page v. Parker, (1861) 43 N. H. 363, 80 Am.
Dec. 172; Rockafellow v. Baker, (1861) 41 Pa. St. 319; Collins v. Jackson,
(1884) 54 Mich. 186, 19 N. W. 947; Lee v. McClelland, (1898) 120 Cal.
147, 52 Pac. 300; Hicks v. Stevens, (1887) 121 Ill. 186, 11 N. E. 241;
Gordon v. Parmalee, (1861) 2 Allen (Mass.) 212.
4
OThat the modern tendency is to repudiate the maxim of caveat emptor,
is supported by an impressive line of recent decisions.
Action for deceit. Burger v. Calek, (1923) 37 Idaho 235. 215 Pac.
981 (false representations as to seepage); McGuffin v. Smith, (1926) 215
Ky. 606, 286 S. W. 884 (false representations as to permanent supply of
ater on farm) ; Champneys v. Irwin, (1919) 106 Wash. 438,
drinking
180 Pac. 405 (false representations as to amount of rental); Peck v.
Robinson, (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) 194 S. W. 456, 831 (false representations
as to amount of timber on land); Graves v. Haynes (Tex. Civ. App.
1921) 231 S. W. 383 (false representations that cattle were sound and
free from disease); Werline v. Aldred, (1916) 57 Okla. 381. 157 Pac. 305
(misrepresentations of value and rent derived from land); Buckley V.
Buckley, (1925) 230 -Mich. 504, 202 N. W. 955 (sale of stock; false
representations by purchaser as to value and corporate assets); Haskell
v. Starbird, (1890) 152 Mass. 117, 142 N. E. 695 (sale of land in Canada:
false representations as to location and quality of land as timber land);
Christensen v. Jauron, (Iowa 1919) 174 N. WV.499 (land trade; misrepresentations as to quality and rental value of land; purchaser actually visited
and looked at land); Hise v. Thomas, (1917) 181 Iowa 700, 165 N. \W.
38 (purchase of business; misrepresentations as to amount and value of
stock on hand); Gallon v. Burns, (1917) 92 Conn. 39, 101 Atli. 504 (purchase
of stock; misrepresentations by officers and stockholders that corporation
was solvent; purchaser had opportunity to inspect books of corporation);
Warne v. Finseth, (1923) 50 N. D. 347, 195 N. W. 573 (land deal;
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bar when the defendant has innocently made misrepresentations."

However, as will be seen, it is one of the important factors in
misrepresentations that land was not stony and was fit for cultivation,:
purchaser actuaily visited land, but it was covered with snow at time and
its cnaracter not apparent).
Counterclaim ba-sed on fraud or deceit as defense, etc.: Emanuel v.
Engst, (1926) 54 N. D. 141, 208 N. W. 840; Conroy Piano Co. v. Pesch,
(Mo. App. 1925) 279 S. AN. 226; Pattiz v. Semple, (D. C. Il1. 1926) 12 F.
(2d) 276; White v. Peters, (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) 185 S. W. 659: Koblick v. Larson. (1922) 57 Cal. App. 462, 207 Pac. 929; Stout v. Martin,
(1920) 87 W. Va. 1, 104 S. E. 157; Sanders v. King, (1923) 208 Ala.
638, 95 So. 19 (rescission) ; Paulson v. Kinney, (1924) 110 Or. 688, 224
Pac. 634 (suit in equity to avoid judgment on contract induced by fraud).
The attitude of courts of recent years is well indicated in Burger v.
Calek, (1923) 37 Idaho 235, 215 Pac. 961, in which the court reversed
the case for error in giving the following instruction: "If you believe
from the evidence that the plaintiff. Burger, could by reasonable investigation and inquiry have ascertained the actual condition of the land
involved, he cannot recover damage from the defendant." In the course
of the opinion, the court explained the change from the older attitude:
"In territorial days this court rendered a decision which supports the
above instruction, Brown v. Bledsoe, 1 Idaho 746. At that time the weight
of authority was perhaps to that effect. In later years this court and
many others have been breaking away from that harsh rule. . . . We
conclude 'that where the vendor makes material representations of fact
concerning the condition or quality of land or article sold, of such a
nature that a man of ordinary prudence might rely upon them, the vendee
is justified in so relying and is undei no duty to make an independent
investigation."
Again, the supreme court of Alabama has held that, "If a false statement is made by one who may be fairly assumed to know that about which
he is talking, it may be accepted as true without question and without
inquiry, although the means of correct information were within reach."
King v. Livingston, (1912) 180 Ala. 118, 60 So. 143. Further, the court
said: "We apprehend that the improbability or incredibility of a statement. judged by ordinary standards of intelligence, is a matter that is
ordinarily relevant only to the question of its acceptance as true by the
other party, and that those qualities never of themselves forestall a right
of action." So, too. the Minnesota court has indicated the decay of the
maxim in Erickson v. Fisher, (1892) 51 Minn. 300, 53 N. W. 638: "The
maxim caveat emptor is not to be carried so far that the law shall ignore
or protect positive fraud successfully practised upon the unwary.
As
between the original parties, one who has intentionally deceived the other
to his prejudice ought not to be heard to say in defense that the other
party ought not to have trusted him."
In Fargo Gas Light. etc., Co. v. Fargo Gas & Electric Co., (1894)
4 N. D. 219. 59 N. W. 1066. the court said: "Ordinarily one who buys
property has a right implicitly to rely upon representations of the seller;
and if they were false and made with intent to deceive the purchaser, the
seller will not be allowed to urge that the buyer, by investigation, could
have discovered their falsity." In commenting upon the rule, the court
observed that "it would, indeed, be a strange rule of law which, when the
seller had successfully entrapped his victim by false statements, and was
called to account in a court of justice for his deceit. would permit him to
escape by urging the folly of his dupe for not suspecting that lie the seller,
was a knave."

Several cases have recognized the distinction between the duty to
investigate and the rule which charges the plaintiff with that knowledge
which he should acquire by the use of his senses. Thus, in Robertson v.
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determining whether the situation is one of the sort in which a
defendant can be held responsible for innocent misstatements.
The gradually narrowing area for the application of the maxim
"caveat emptor" 4 2 may be attributed to revised concepts of what
the parties may justifiably expect from each other in the type of
transaction in question. Because they may normally expect honesty in connection with a sale of land or goods,4" there is no
duty, as against a fraudulent vendor, for the vendee to investigate
the truth of the former's statements." In some of the cases, stress
Smith, (Mo. App. 1918) 204 S. NV. 413, in which the defendant in an action
for deceit relied upon the maxim of caveat emptor, the court pointed out
that such a defense was available only where the falsity of the vendor's
representations was open and patent to the senses, but that one making
a misrepresentation, the falsity of which was not open and apparent, could
not shield himself by charging negligence on the part of the vendee in
failing to discover the fraud. The same point is made in Mignault v.
Goldman, (1919) 235 Mass. 205, 125 N. E. 189; Gallon v. Burns, (1917)
92 Conn. 39, 101 Ati. 504; Kluge v. Ries, (1917) 66 Ind. App. 610, t,17
N. E. 262.
4"Scott v. Moore, (1909) 89 Ark. 321, 116 S. W. 660; Perry v.
Rogers, (1901) 62 Neb. 898, 87 N. W. 1063; Smith v. Richards. (1839)
13 Pet. (U. S.) 26, 10 L. Ed. 42; Robertson v. Frey, (1914) 72 Or. 599,
144 Pac. 128; Hansen v. Klien, (1907) 136 Iowa 101, 113 N. W. 504;
Martin v. Burford, (C. C. A. 9th Cir. 1910) 181 Fed. 922; Stevens v.
Allen, (1893) 51 Kan. 144, 32 Pac. 9222.
"2The maxim is still applicable in cases in which the falsity of the
defendant's statement is obvious to the senses. "If one voluntarily shuts
his eyes when to open them is to see, such a one is guilty of an act of
folly (in dealing at arm's length with another) to his own injury; and
the affairs of men could not go on if courts were being called upon to rip
up transactions of that sort. The vendee is held to know what his own
eves would disclose, and knowing, could not be deceived." Judd Y. Walker,
(1908) 215 Mo. 312, 114 S. W. 979. "The recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation is not justified in relying upon its truth if its falsity is
obvious." Restatement of Torts, Tentative Draft, No. 13, Sec. 617. In the
comment, it is explained that "the rule stated in this section applies only
where the recipient of the misrepresentation is capable of appreciating its
falsity by the use of his senses."
43"Until there be written into the law some precept or rule to the
effect that the heart of a man is as prone to wickedness as is the smoke
to go upward, and that everyone must deal with his fellow man as if he
was a thief and a robber, it ought not to be held that trust cannot be put
in a positive assertion of a material fact, known to the speaker and
unknown to the hearer, and intended to be relied upon." Judd v. Walker,
(1908) 215 Mo. 312, 114 S. W 979.
44Buckley v. Buckley, (1925) 230 Mich. 504, 202 N. W. 955; Gallon v.
Burns, (1917) 92 Conn. 39, 101 AtI. 504; Varne v. Finseth, (1973) 50
N. D. 347, 195 N. W. 575; Oben v. Adams, (1915) 89 Vt. 158, 94 AtI.
506; Dodge v. Pope, (1883) 93 Ind. 480; Burger v. Calek, (1923) 37
Idaho 235, 215 Pac. 981; Champneys v. Irwin, (1919) 106 Wash. 438,
180 Pac. 405; Graves v. Haynes, (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) 231 S. W. 383;
Werline v. Alred, (1916) 57 Okla. 381, 157 Pac. 305; Mignault v. Goldman, (1919) 234 Mass. 205, 125 N. E. 189; Christensen v. Jauron, (Iowa
1919) 174 N. W. 499; McCandless v. Greusel, (1919) 103 Neb. 472, 172
N. W. 249.
In some of the cases, it seems, the court allows a recovery not so
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is placed upon the defendant's knowledge or means of knowledge
and the burden which an investigation would put upon the plaintiff.
Such are cases involving the sale of land at a distance or in
a condition that immediate examination to determine its quality or
quantity would be impractical. 45 Many modern cases, however,
go even further and permit the vendee to recover from a dishonest
vendor, even though the falsity of the misrepresentations could
have easily been discovered by the plaintiff. 46 The vendee in
such cases can thus expect at least honesty from his vendor.
The comparative availability of the facts to the parties is of
great significance, however, in determining whether tile one may
properly expect more, namely, complete accuracy of the information given.4 7 When there is proper reliance upon the accuracy of
the representations, the entire transaction is based upon the
existence of the facts represented. In the case of a sale, the
subject of the sale is the thing designated or described by the
representations of the vendor. If the subject is otherwise than as
represented, immunity of the vendor because the representations
were innocently, rather than fraudulently or negligently false, has
the effect of holding the vendee to a purchase which he did not
make. He is justified in expecting the bargain which he made,
much because the plaintiff was acting properly, but because the defendant
had acted more improperly. Apparently, there is here a quasi-punitive
policy involved. Thus, the court in Rollins v. Quimby, (1908) 200 Mass.
162, 86 N. E. 350, observed: "The law does not attempt to save parties
from the consequences of their own improvidence and negligence; but it
looks with even less favor upon misrepresentation and fraud."
45Haskell v. Starbird, (1890) 152 Mass. 117, 142 N. E. 695; Ladner
v. Balsley, (1897) 103 Iowa 674, 72 N. W. 787; Brees v. Anderson,
(1922) 154 Minn. 123, 191 N. W. 266; Gridley v. Ross, (1926) 37 Idaho
693, 217 Pac. 989; Martin v. Jordan, (1872) 60 Me. 531; Jackson v. Armstrong, (1883) 50 Mich. 65, 14 N. W. 702, with which compare Boddy v.
Henry, (1901) 113 Iowa 462, 85 N. W. 771; Gordon v. Parmalce, (1861)
2 Allen (Mass.) 212; Lee v. McClelland, (1898) 120 Cal. 147, 52 Pac.
300; 46Moore v. Recek, (1896) 163 Ill. 17, 44 N. E. 868.
Dodge v. Pope, (1883) 93 Ind. 480; Buckley v. Buckley, (1925)
230 Mich. 504, 202 N. W. 955; Gallon v. Burns, (1917) 92 Conn. 39, 101
Ati. 504; Crompton v. Beedle, (1910) 83 Vt. 287, 75 At. 331; King v.
Livingston, (1912) 180 Ala. 118, 60 So. 143; Steen v. Weisten, (1908)
51 Or. 473, 94 Pac. 834; Currie v. Mallory. (1923) 185 N. C. 206, 116
S. E.4 564.
7"We think we may safely lay down this principle, that wherever a
sale is made of property not present, but at a remote distance, which the
seller knows the purchaser has never seen, but which he buys upon the representation of the seller, relying on its truth, then the representation, in
effect, amounts to a warranty; at least, that the seller is bound to make
good the representation." Smith v. Richards, (1839) 13 Pet. (U. S.) 26,
10 L. Ed. 42. This case was one of rescission, but the reasoning quoted
would be applicable to an action for damages.
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and only a liability of warranty on the vendor's part will assure
s
him of this.
For the most part, case law during the early years of the
nineteenth century restricted closely the rule of warranty by the
vendor, applying instead the rule of caveat emptor to the vendee.40
These decisions reflected the dominant spirit and ethics of the
period, a policy of commercial individualism which permitted the
purchaser at most to rely only on the honesty of his seller. The
policy is understandable in an age of expanding commerce when
"8In Smith v. Richards, (1839) 13 Pet. (U. S.) 26, 10 L. Ed. 42, the
court reasoned in this way:
"If, under these circumstances, the seller were not bound by his representation, we know not in what cases we ought to apply the well-known
and excellent maxim, 'fides servanda est.' We have now compared the
cases, and upon principle, have shovn that they do not apply to this. But
we will conclude our opinion, by referring to a case, later than all those
which we have been examining, the reasoning of which is conclusive, as
we think, in favour of the view which we have taken. It is the case of
Shepherd v. Kain, 5 Barn. & Ald. 240. It was a case for the breach of
warranty, as to the character of a ship. The advertisement for the sale
of the ship described her as a copper fastened vessel; but there were subjoined these words: 'The vessel, with her stores as she now lies, to be
taken with all faults, without allowance for any defects whatever.' It
appeared at the trial, that the ship when sold, was only partially copper
fastened, and that she was not what w%-as
called in the trade a copper
fastened vessel. It appeared also, that the plaintiff, before lie bought.her,
had a full opportunity to examine her situation.
"The court said, the meaning of the advertisement must be that the
seller will not be responsible for any faults which a copper fastened ship
may have. Suppose a silver service is sold with all faults, and it turns out
to be plated; can there be any doubt that the vendor would be liable?
With all faults, must mean, which it may have consistently vith its being
the thing described. Here, the ship was not a copper fastened ship at
all, and therefore the verdict was right. This case decides, that even
where the plaintiff had a'full opportunity of examination, the term, all
faults, did not exempt the seller from liability for any defect but what
was consistent with its being the thing described; and, in effect, that the
description amounted to a warranty. In the case before us, where the
appellee had no opportunity for examination (and in that respect the case
is much stronger in his favor than the one just cited) the terms of the
sale, in our opinion, put upon the appellee no hazard or risk, but those
which were consistent with the mine being such as it \as described; that
those terms in no degree exempted him from liability for misrepresentation; but if the mine had been such as described, then that they would
have exempted him from any liability for failure in its anticipated produce.
"It may be that the appellant made the representation under the influence of delusion; but it is sufficient, to decide this case, for us to know
that the representation was untrue in material parts of it."
In Barr v. Gibson, (1838) 3 M. & WV.389, the court was faced with
the question whether a ship aground at the time it was sold, both vendor
and vendee being ignorant of the fact, was a "ship" for purposes of sale.
it was held that it was, caveat emptor.
49
Parkinson v. Lee, (1802) 2 East 314; Barr v. Gibson, (1838) 3
M. & W. 389; Chanter v. Hopkins, (1838) 4 M. & W. 399; Wright v.
Hart, (1837) 18 Wend. (N. Y.) 449.
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emphasis is placed upon advantage to the dealer. Referring to the
decisions glorifying the caveat emptor rule. Professor Hamilton
has said:
"Behind it all, selecting, trimming, adjusting and directing the
stately march of the argument is reason as it was currently understood. The judges knew that one man was as good as another;
they believed in the economic virtues; they made their decisions in
private actions a declaration of public policy. Their common
sense gave to a mass of verbal fragments from unknown climates
of opinion the pulsing life of American democracy." 50
Today a different social policy is indicated. Expansion of
trade is less important than mutual confidence between buyer and
seller. Encouragement for dealers is needed less than encouragement for customers. The law again reflects reason as currently
understood, and caveat emptor declines as warranty and liability
for innocent misrepresentation increases."
Under both the Sales Act and modern decisions, the vendor
is held to warrant that express representations are accurate if
the buyer was in fact uninformed and the seller was in a position
to know the facts or purported to be informed with respect thereto. 52 Modern authorities permit a rescission and an action

for

restitution in such a case. 3 Implied warranties, without express
representation, assure the buyer that the goods are fit for the
purpose intended provided the seller makes the selection,' 4 and
5OHamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, (1931) 40 Yale L. J.
1133, 1182.
5This tendency is more observable in America than in England, where
the twentieth century decision in Heilbut, Symons & Co. v. Buckleton,
[1913]
52 A. C. 30, lent fresh vigor to caveat emptor.
Gotham Nat'l Bank v. Sharood, (C. C. A. 2nd Cir. 1928) 23 F.
(2d) 567; Springfield Shingle Co. v. Edgecomb Mill Co., (1909) 52 Wash.
620, 101 Pac. 233; Cunningham Auto Co. v. Drake, (Iowa 1929) 224
N. W. 48; McClintock v. Emick, (1888) 87 Ky. 160, 7 S. W. 903; Worden
v. Peck, (1928) 245 Mich. 237, 222 N. W. 101; Norris v. Parker, (1896)
15 Tex. Civ. App. 117, 38 S. W. 259; Hobart v. Young, (1891) 63 Vt.
363, 21 At. 612, 12 L.R.A. 693; Lalime v. Hobbs, (1926) 255 Mass. 189,
151 N. E. 59; Rittenhouse Co. v. Kissner, (1916) 129 Md. 102, 98 Ati. 361.
"Where the seller makes representations regarding the goods upon
which the buyer justifiably relies as an inducement to the bargain, the law
imposes upon the seller the obligation to make such representations good.
"The buyer is ordinarily justified in relying upon the seller's representations relating to the goods where the buyer is uninformed regarding the
matter in question while the seller is or purports to be better informed."
Vold,3 Sales (1931) 443.
5 "A person who has paid money to another because of a mistake
qf fact . . . is entitled to restitution from the other if the mistake was
induced . . . by his innocent and material misrepresentation." Restatement of Restitution, sec. 28.
54Minneapolis Steel Co. v. Casey Land Agency, (1924) 51 N. D. 832,
201 N. W. 172; Norvell-Wilder Co. v. McCamey, (Tex. Civ. App. 1927)
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that the goods conform to sample or other description," or, if
so sold, to both. Caveat emptor has, in all these respects, given
way to caveat vendor."6 Business mores and practice have led
purchasers to expect as much, and for this reason such expectations are justifiable. It is, in fact, a plausible position that business
practices encourage still further expectations and reliance.
"The ordinary buyer gets the benefit of the common maxim'the buyer is always right.' The modern seller will go to great
lengths- to please his customers. In practice, he does not stop at
his legal obligations, but takes any reasonable steps to retain
'5 7
good will."

Thus it is that the actual conduct of business has greatly
increased the justifiable expectations of the buyer, and the law
quite properly insists that he obtain these benefits. Moreover,
it is regarded as beneficial to business as an institution. In
discussing the gradual shift of business risks from buyer to seller,
Professor Vold has concluded that:
"The business experience of the last century has abundantly
demonstrated that commercial transactions as business is now
organized are rather benefited than burdened by the seller's making
good his representations if they turn out to be inaccurate. The
satisfied customer returns with more business, and is himself a
walking advertisement to bring still further business to the seller.
Responsible sellers expecting to grow in business stature and develop commercial good will among their customers have found it
expedient to stand behind their representations. ..

. Buyers, too,

have found it convenient and economical to rely on the seller's
statements or labels, he having the greater detailed information,
rather than at each successive transfer in the course of distribution to incur afresh the burdens, delay, and expense of detailed
inspection, investigation, or testing. Accordingly, the efficiency,
dispatch, and economy of a 'trust the seller' attitude in marketing
of goods has become so manifest that now sellers themselves whose
representations can be confidently relied on find such reliance not
290 S. W. 772; Parker v. S. G. Shaghalian, (1923) 244 Mass. 19. 138 N. E.
236; American Soda Fountain Co. v. Medford Grocery Co., (1928) 128
Or. 83, 262 Pac. 939; Drummond v. Van Ingen, (1887) 12 A. C. 284:
Westinghouse Elec. Co. v. Dayton Co., (C. C. A. 6th Cir. 1923) 287 Fed.
439; Boston Woven-Hose Co. v. Kendall, (1901) 178 Mass. 232, 39 N. E.
657, 86 Am. St. Rep. 478. See Void, Sales (1931) 457.
5
3Bradford v. Manly, (1816) 13 Mass. 139, 7 Am. Dec. 122; F. A. D.
Andrea, Inc. v. Dodge, (C. C. A. 3rd Cir. 1926) 15 F. (2d) 1003: Collins Cotton Co. v. Wooten-Burton Sales Co., (1921) 81 Okla. 67. 196
Pac. 681. Vold, Sales (1931) 451.
56See Vold, Sales (1931) 445.
57
Bogert and Fink, Business Practice Regarding Warranties on the
Sale of Goods, (1930) 25 Ill. L. Rev. 400, 415.
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a commercial burden but on the whole a tremendously valuable
business asset." ' s
While sweeping statements are to be avoided in a field in
which there is so much litigation, it is not too much to conclude
that strict liability is limited to cases which disclose some such
factors as those just described. It is confined to situations where
reliance upon the existence of the facts as expressly represented
or implied, as a factual basis for an opinion, is justified because
the relationship of the parties disclosed (1) peculiar and almost
exclusive means of knowledge, or (2) a plausible means of knowledge of facts represented in statements made with emphatic certainty.
Measure of Damages.-In cases which fall within this group,
what is and should be the measure of liability? The plaintiff
thought he was entering a transaction which would gain for him
certain economic advantages. This is the very function of a
contract. His belief, and the action taken pursuant thereto, were
justifiable. He has failed to obtain the advantage, the expectation
of which induced him to enter the transaction. If he has dealt
with the defendant as the other party to a contract, the amount
of his recovery should not depend upon whether he or his lawyer
calls the action one "in contract" or "in tort." Whether for breach
of warranty or deceit or in any other form of action, if he demands
it, it would seem good policy that he recover the value of the
reasonable expectation which he has failed to obtain. Many cases
If, however, he has suffered not only
allow him this recovery."
58Vold, Sales (1931) 444.
59Dilenbreck v. Davis, (1919) 186 Iowa 30, 172 N. W. 184; Exchange
Bank v. Gaitskill, (1896)'18 Ky. L. Rep. 532, 37 S. W. 160; Purdy v.
Underwood, (1918) 87 Or. 56, 169 Pac. 536; Kuehl v. Parmenter, (1923)
195 Wis. 497, 192 N. W. 429; Nash v. Minnesota Title Ins. & Trust Co.,

(1895) 163 Mass. 574, 40 N. E. 1039; Drake v. Holbrook, (1902) 23
Ky. L. Rep. 194, 66 S. W. 512; Cartwrigbt v. Hughes, (1933) 226 Ala.
464, 147 So. 399; Becker v. McKinnie, (1920) 106 Kan. 426, 186 Pac. 496.
Contra (denying contract measure of damages, and applying tort ineasure): Hindman v. First Nat'l Bank, (C. C. A. 6th Cir. 1902) 112 Fed.
931, 57 L. R. A. 108 (cert. denied in (1902) 186 ,U. S. 483, 22 Sup. Ct.
493, 146 L. Ed. 1261; Emery v. Third Nat'l Bank of Pittsburgh, (1932)

308 Pa. St. 504, 162 Atl. 281.
In the following cases, the plaintiff asked for and was allowed merely
the sum invested: Pellette v. Mann Auto Co., (1924) 116 Kan. 16, 225
Pac. 1067; Palmer v. Goldberg, (1906) 128 Wis. 103, 107 N. W. 478;
Laney-Payne Farm Loan Co. v. Greenhaw, (1928) 177 Ark. 589, 9 S. W.
(2d) 19; Trust Co. of Norfolk v. Fletcher, (1929) 57 Va. 868, 148 S. E.
785; Robinson v. Standard Stores, (1932) 52 R. I. 271, 160 At. 471.
In the following cases the tort measure of damages was applied, but it
does not appear that the plaintiff asked for the contract measure and was
denied it, nor does it appear that the contract measure would have been
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disappointment but injury, if instead of failing to obtain a justifiably expected advantage, the plaintiff has sustained actual loss,
he should, of course, recover therefor. In other words, if the
so-called tort measure of damages is greater than the contract
measure, he should be entitled to a recovery determined thereby,
provided the. loss is the type of hazard against which it is the
policy of the law to protect him, namely, one arising out of the
falsity of the representation which induced him to enter into the
transaction. There seems to be a tendency to sustain this position. 0
Whether the "contract" or the "tort" measure of damages is
applicable, there must, of course, be the appropriate relationship
between the falsity of the representations and the disappointed
expectations or loss of the plaintiff. 6 In Beare V. Wright, the
court, in discussing this problem, said:
"It is therefore dear that that part of the loss which would
have resulted from the making of such a trade on the same terms
without deceit is due to plaintiff's own folly, and is not properly
chargeable to the false representation."
The court continued its discussion by referring to a New Hampshire case.
"An instructive case on this subject is that of Page v.Parker,
43 N. H. 363, 80 Am. Dec. 172. The plaintiff had been induced
by false representations to purchase an interest in a marble quarry,
and pay therefor a sum much greater than its actual value. The
defendant had made many representations. Some were false, some
true and others immaterial. The plaintiff sued to recover damages
for deceit. The court held that the measure of damages in such
cases is the difference between the value of the property as it
actually was, and its value as it would have been if it were such
as it was represented to be in twse particularsin relation to which
the false and fraudident representationswere made. The qualifygreater:

Freeman v. Harbaugh Co., (1911)

114 Minn. 283, 130 N. W.

1110; Stafford v. Drewry, (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) 32 S. W. (2d) 255;
Snider v. McAtee, (1912)

165 Mo. App. 260, 147 S. W. 136. affirmed in

(Mo. 1915) 178 S.W. 484; Bowman v. Van Pelt, (1878) 91 Ky. App. 884.

6OMatlock v. Reppy, (1886) 47 Ark. 148, 14 S. W. 546 (held that
plaintiff had an option as to the measure of damages) ; Baumchen v. Donahoe, (1932) 215 Ia. 512, 242 N. W. 533 (plaintiff also recovered the amount
lost by reason of assessment of the stock); Bowman v. Parker, (1867)
40 Vt.
410 (same).
GmPage v. Parker, (1861) 43 N. H. 363, 80 Am. Dec. 172; Van Epps
v. Harrison, (1843) 5 Hill (N. Y.) 63, 40 Am. Dec. 314; People v. S. W.
Strauss & Co., (1936) 156 Misc. Rep. 642, 282 N. Y. S. 972; Bowman
v. Parker, (1867) 40 Vt. 410; Beare v. Wright, (1905) 14 N. D. 26, 103

N. W. 632, 69 L. R. A. 409; Morrell v. Wiley, (1935) 119 Conn. 578, 178
Atl. 121. But see Fottler v. Moseley, (1904) 185 Mass. 563, 70 N. F_.
1040; Askin v. Lewin, (1931) 140 Misc. Rep. 615, 251 N. Y. S.405.
62(1905) 14 N. D. 26, 103 N. W. 632, 69 L R. A. 409.
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ing clause which we have italicized was said to be advisable in
order to make it clear to the jury that the damages must be confined to such items of loss as were proximately caused by the
representations which were false and material. To illustrate: If
there were ten material representations, and only one was false.
the plaintiff was entitled to compensation only to the extent that
the value of the quarry was diminished by the nonexistence of the
one fact which was falsely represented to exist."
In Fottler v. Moseley,6 a stockbroker was held liable for the
depreciation of the plaintiff's stock which by fraudulent misrepresentations he had induced plaintiff not to sell, although the
depreciation was caused by the embezzlement of an officer of the
corporation, and had no connection with or relation to the falsity
of the defendant's misstatements.
"The defendant," said the court, "if he fraudulently induced
the plaintiff to keep his stock, took the risk of all such changes.
. . . It would be unjust to the plaintiff in such a case, and
impracticable, to enter upon an inquiry as to the cause of the
fall in value, if the plaintiff suffered from the fall wholly by reason
of the defendant's fraud. The risk of a fall, from whatever
cause, is presumed to have been contemplated by the defendant
when he falsely and fraudulently induced the plaintiff to retain
his stock."
This reasoning and the policy reflected by the rule seem totally
unconvincing. Just why the defendant should be required to
assume all the risks of loss because he caused some risks does not
readily appear. Just why it would be unjust to the plaintiff to
inquire into the cause of the fall in value, is not apparent. The
defendant's conduct is tortious because he has fraudulently made
false statements. It would seem that policy requires only that
he make good the loss (or the expected advantage, if the contractual rule is applicable) only in so far as it is connected with
the falsity of his statements.
A more persuasive technique was employed in Van Epps v.
Harrison64 where the complainant had paid much more than the
property would have been worth even if the misrepresentations
had been true.
"We must not go back to the date of the contract for the price,"
said the court, "and then come down to the present day for the
actual value of the land, and charge the plaintiff with the difference. The defendant must bear the consequences of the prevailing delusion about prices and new towns under which the purchase
was made. On the other hand, the plaintiff cannot say that his
63(1904) 185 Mass. 563, 70 N. E. 1040.
64(1843) 5 Hill (N. Y.) 63, 40 Am. Dec. 314.
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fraud has worked no injury because everybody has now found
out that the land never was worth anything for the purpose of
building a town on it. The cause must, as far as practicable, be
tried just as it would have been tried the day after the contract
was made, if the question had arisen at that time. The jury must
assume what the parties then believed, that the land %%-as valuable
as the site for a town and then inquire how much less the land
was worth for building purposes, taking the surface as it
actually existed, than it would have been worth for those purposes
had the plaintiff's representations concerning the surface been
true."
It seems unnecessarily harsh, and completely outside the policy
of the law of misrepresentation, to require even a fraudulent
defendant to insure against risks completely irrelevant to the
matter -misrepresented. Mistakes of the plaintiff not induced by
the defendant's misstatements should have no place in the rules
of recoverable damages. Neither a fraudulent nor a negligent,
much less an innocent defendant should be held to such insurance
for the patent reason that the person who relies on the misrepresentations neither expects nor is entitled to expect such protection.
To be sure, he was induced to enter into the transaction because he
believed in the truth of the misstatements. But this means only
that he should recover for losses related to their falsity. Normally
he would not believe that because the misstatements were true there
was no possibility of loss and, if he did so believe, he has found
that he was mistaken. Losses which would have been sustained
even had the misstatements been true should be borne by the
person whose mistake subjected him to the risk thereof.
a. Statements of Fact. The types of situation where plaintiff
may rely upon the existence of facts as represented are familiar.
Whether described by the names of the legal doctrines employed
to afford particular relief, i.e., estoppel by conduct, implied warranty, restitution, or deceit, these situations seem to have the
common factors which make the relationship of the parties such
as properly to bring it within the principle of strict or absolute
responsibility. Whether the court is approaching the problem with
one or another of the legal formulae available, its judgment is
directed toward the same basic problem, viz. a determination of
what the parties are entitled to expect in view of the social and
economic context in which the transaction is set.
Most of the cases within this group involve persons who were
parties to a contract of sale in connection with which the representation was made by the vendor. If the vendor has made "un-
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qualified" statements "as of his own personal knowledge," he is
liable in an action of deceit in many jurisdictions. Stock transactions are common instances.65 The vendee in this type of case
is usually ignorant of the facts upon which the value of the
stock is based. Unless he is one of those rare persons who is in
a position and has the ability and inclination to make his own
investigation, he is apt to rely heavily upon information received
from the vendor. The vendor himself may or may not be in a
better position to know. He may be an officer of the corporation
selling his own stock or, like the vendee, he may be an outsider
with no more access to the facts in question than any other
member of the public. The mere fact of ownership, however,
at once suggests that he may have utilized the opportunities for
knowledge that are equally available to others. If, now, he makes
the representations in a manner which implies that he has availed
himself of these opportunities and has acquired personal knowledge,
the impression upon the vendee will be much the same as though
the vendor had exclusive access thereto. Thus, if the vendor makes
statements with sufficient emphasis of certainty to satisfy the
"to his personal knowledge" formula, he may properly be required
to guarantee their accuracy.
It may be that it is not the vendor who furnishes the information upon which the purchaser relied. It may be the vendor's
agent, 66 or an officer 67 or director 6 of the corporation who is thus
connected with the subject matter of the transaction so intimately
that he is or may be supposed to be in a position to furnish accurate
information or to have confirmed the unqualified statements which
he makes. Whether the statements are technically "promises,"
made by a party to the contract itself, or "representations,"' made
by such a party or by someone else closely related to the economic
issue, is in itself unimportant. 9 What is important is that state-5See cases under note 36, supra.
Kuehl v. Parmenter, (1923) 195 Iowa 497, 192 N. W. 229; Churchhill
v. St. George Development Co., (1916) 174 App. Div. 1, 160 N. Y. S.
357; Osborne v. Holt, (1922) 92 W. Va. 410, 114 S. E. 801 (promoter).
67
Thompson v. Walker, (1931) 253 Mich. 126, 234 N. W. 144; Snider
v. McAtee, (1912) 165 Mo. App. 260, 147 S. W. 136; Bingham v. Fish,
(1914) 86 N. J. L. 316, 90 Atl. 1106; Drake v. Holbrook, (1902) 23 Ky.
L. Rep. 1941, 66 S. W. 512.
68SCole v. Cassidy. (1885) 138 Mass. 437, 52 Am. Rep. 284; Bystroin
v. Villard, (1916) 175 App. Div. 433, 162 N. Y. S. 100 (appeal dismissed)
(1917) 220 N. Y.'765, 116 N. E. 1038; Barber v. Keeling, (Tex. Civ. App.
1918) 204 S. W. 139; General Finance Corp. v. Keystone Credit Corp.,
A. 4th Cir. 1931) 50 F. (2d) 872.
(C. C.
69
The difference between a "representation" and a "promise" seems to
66
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ments are made by one who professes a plausible certainty of
knowledge, or whose position makes accurate information peculiarly
available to him. Not only parties to the contract itself, but those
interested in and closely connected with the subject matter who,
because of such connection, are in a position to furnish accurate
information, or who purport to impart it, may well be held to
answer here for even innocent mistakes.70
The defendant's connection with the situation may be that of
have been overstressed. "In either case there must be a correspondence
between word and action, if the representation is to be true, or the promise
to be kept. But the duty of the representor is 'to suit the word to the
action;' of the promisor, to 'suit the action of the word.'" (Bower,
Actionable Misrepresentation (1927) 38. This purely analytical distinction, however, is not particularly helpful. Normally, representations will
apply only to matters of existing or past fact, while promises or undertakings will pertain only to future happenings. Yet, the existence or nonexistence of present facts may be the subject of a promise or undertaking,
that is, an undertaking to make good in damages if they do not exist. So,
too, the happening of a future event may be the subject of a promise by
way of warranty, that is a promise to make good in damages if it does not
happen as warranted. By continued lip service to the rule of Derry v.
Peek, however, and by insistence upon preserving the formal distinctions
between actions contractual and delectual, English law insists that a statement must be one or the other and if it is clearly a promise, it is enforceable, if at all, as such, and does not create liability as a representation.
(See Maddison v. Alderson [1883] 8 A. C. 467. It is "a promise or nothing." See Bower, Actionable Misrepresentations [19271 43.) It is this
attitude that Professor Williston deplored. See supra, note 3.
701t has been pointed out that in many cases in which liability is imposed
as for innocent misrepresentations, the misrepresentations were not in fact
"innocent;" they were either consciously or negligently false. This very
fact, however, indicates the basis for the rule of strict liability. The
plaintiff, to the defendant's knowledge, relies upon the complete accuracy of
the statement and because in the vast number of cases that will arise there
will be no mistake unless there is fraud or negligence, neither of which
is tolerated in the kind of transaction in question, he is justified in such
reliance. The fact that ordinarily the defendant can ascertain the existence
or non-:existence of the facts which he represents justifies the plaintiff in
interpreting the representation as an undertaking to be responsible for the
truth of the facts stated. It is helpful to compare certain situations in
which a similar rule is applied as to representations which, if false, threaten
harm to person and property. While in most cases a party can expect only
reasonable care on the part of the other with respect to the truth of such
statements, there are cases in which liability is imposed for innocent misrepresentations. See Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., (1932) 168 Wash. 456,
12 P. (2d) 409, 15 P. (2d) 1118 (windshield glass which was shatterable
represented as non-breakable). See Perkins, (1920) 5 Iowa L. B. 6, 86,
discussing the liability for unwholesome food when there has been no
negligence on the part of the manufacturer, who is held liable to a consumer with whom he has had no contractual relations, but who, because
he is the manufacturer, has a close and obvious economic interest in its
consumption. While ordinarily the mere production and marketing of an
article entitles the consumer to expect no more than reasonable care and
skill in its preparation to insure its safe use, it may well be that in the
case of foodstuffs and articles highly dangerous to life and safety, it is
acceptable policy to permit reliance upon the truth of the representations.
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an agent who misrepresents the authority which he has to act for
his principal in the transaction in question2' This is an obvious
case. Of course, the agent better than anyone else is in a position
to know the extent of his authority, and, of course, the third person purports to deal with the principal through the agent in
justifiable reliance on such authority. Again, the defendant's connection with the situation may be that of bailee or one who holds
himself out as a bailee of goods, or one who is the obligor on a
negotiable instrument, warehouse receipt or bill of lading, in
which case still more obviously the public is entitled to rely upon
the accuracy of the representations made with respect to the
chattel or obligation in question. The policy here is so clear that,
with occasional exceptions, there has never been any serious
question as to the law. Business would be greatly upset if complete reliance could not be placed upon the existence of facts
7Collen v. Wright, (1857) 8 El. and BI. 645; Starkey v. Bank of
England, [1903] A. C. 114; Young v. Toynbee, [1910] 1 K. B. 215; Golden
v. Ellwood, (1921) 299 Ill. 73, 132 N. E. 223; Chieppo v. Chieppo, (1914)
88 Conn. .233, 90 Atl. 940; Mendelsohn v. Holton, (1925) 253 Mass. 362, 149
N. E. 38; Hill v. First Nat'l Bank, (1917) 129 Ark. 265, 195 S. W. 678;
Patterson v. Lippincott, (1885) 47 N. J. L. 457, 54 Am. Rep. 178; Grieb
and Erickson v. Estberg, (1925) 186 Wis. 174, 202 N. W. 331; Dunbar v.
Hansen, (1926) 68 Utah 398, 250 Pac. 982; Moore v. Maddock, (1928)
225 App. Div. 401, 231 N. Y. S. 291; Clements v. Bank, (1928) 177 Ark.
1085, 9 S. W. (2d) 569; Boelter v. National Mfrs. Bank, (1927) 194
Wis. 1, 215 N. W. 436.
In Chieppo v. Chieppo, (1914) 88 Conn. 233, 90 At. 940, it was held
that "If the agent honestly believed that he had an authority which he
did not possess, he may be sued on an implied warranty of authority. If
he knew or . . . ought to have known that he had not the authority which
he professed to have he may be sued in the action of deceit."
In a number of earlier cases, the agent was held liable on the contract
itself. Ormsly v. Kendall, (1839) 2 Ark. 338; Lasater v. Crutchfield,
(1909) 92 Ark. 535, 123 S. W. 394; Crawford v. Barkley, (1850) 18 Ala.
270; Belisle v. Clark, (1873) 49 Ala. 98; Wells v. Maley, (1884) 6 Ky.
L. Rep. 77; Hatch v. Smith, (1809) 5 Mass. 42; Pettinghill v. McGregor,
(1841) 12 N. H. 179; Meech v. Smith, (1831) 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 315;
Church v. Varian, (1858) 28 Barb. (N. Y.) 644; Palmer v. Stephens,
(1845) 1 Denio (N. Y.) 471; Layng v. Stewart, (1841) 1 Watts and S.
(Pa.) 222; Bank v. Wray, (1849) 35 S. C. L. 87, 51 Am. Dec. 659. And
see the recent decisions of Gillis v. White, (1925) 214 Ala. 22, 106 So.
166; Medlin v. Church, (1925) 132 S. C. 498, 129 S. E. 830; Williams
v. De Soto Oil Co., (C. C. A. 8th Cir. 1914) 213 Fed. 194; Tinken v.
Tallmadge, (1891) 54 N. J. L. 117, 22 Ati. 996; Wisconsin Farm Co. v.
Watson, (1915) 160 Wis. 638, 152 N. W. 449; McCann v. Clark, (1914)

166 Iowa 705, 148 N. W. 1025.

Under the Uniform Negotiable Instrument Act, it is held that an agent
who executes a negotiable instrument, though purporting to do so as agent,
is liable on the instrument itself if he does not have the authority which
he professes to have. Ryan v. Hebert,. (1924) 46 R. I. 47, 124 Atd. 657;
Austin Co. v. Gross, (1923) 98 Conn. 782, 120 Atd. 596; New Georgia
Bank v. Lippman, (1928) 249 N. Y. 307, 164 N. E. 108.
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without which the transaction would be impossible. Thierefore,
when a warehouseman innocently represents that he holds specified
goods of another, 71a or when a carrier issues a negotiable receipt
or bill of lading for goods, 7' or when an obligor on such an instrument delivers the goods but fails to require surrender of the
documentary evidence thereof, 73 he is universally liable to one who
deals with the bailor or shipper in reliance thereon and with no
reason to suspect that the facts are not as represented thereby. The
7
defendant's honesty and care are no defense.
71a"Even apart from any legislation the doctrine of estoppel should
be applicable. The common use of documents of title for transferring property makes it incumbent upon those who issue such documents to know
that the statements contained therein are likely to be relied upon. If they
are, therefore, relied upon to the detriment of a purchaser, the bailee should
not be permitted to deny their truth." 2 Williston, Sales (1905) sec. 418.
At common law, there is ample authority for the bailee's liability by
estoppel for the non-existence of goods which he never received or which
were misdescribed by him. Gillett v. Hill, (1834) 2 C. & M. 530; Relyea
v. New Haven'Carrier-Ship Co., (1873) 42 Conn. 579; Livingston v. Anderson, (1907) 2 Ga. App. 274, 58 S. E. 505; Riley v. Loma Vista Ranch Co.,
(1905) 1 Cal. App. 488, 82 Pac. 686; Franklin Nat'l Bank v. Whitehead,
(1898) 149 Ind. 560, 49 N. E. 592; State v. Interstate Surety Co., (1924)
48 S. D. 57, 201 N. W. 717; Nowell v. Seattle Transfer Co., (1911) 63
Wash. 685, 116 Pac. 287; McNeil v. Hill, (C. C. 1865), Minn. Fed. Cas.
No. 8914; Hanover Nat'l Bank v. American Dock Co., (1896) 148 N. Y.
612, 43 N. E. 72; Stewart v. Phoenix Ins. Co., (1882) 77 Tenn. 104;
First Nat'l Bank v. Dean, (1892) 17 N. Y. S. 375.
72On the theory that the agents of a carrier have no authority to issue
bills of lading for goods not received, the English law did not apply to
such bailees the doctrine of estoppel. See Grant v. Norway, (1851) 10
C. B. 665. In the United States authority is divided. See cases collected
in 2 Williston, Sales (1905) sec. 419. The Uniform Bills of Lading Act
eliminates the exception. See Sec. 23. The Act has a provision to similar effect relating to misdescription. See Sec. 23. So, too, the Uniform
Warehouse Receipts-Act has similar provisions as to the non-existence and
misdescription of the goods. See Sec. 20. See Nashville, etc., R. Co. v.
Flournoy, (1913) 139 Ga. 582, 77 S. E. 797; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v.
Cleveland, (1916) 61 Okla. 64, 160 Pac. 328; Gleason v. Bamberg, etc..
R. Co., (1923) 124 S. C. 88, 117 S. E. 188; Brooke v. New York, etc.,
R. Co., (1885) 108 Pa. St. 529, 1 At. 206; Sioux City, etc., R. Co. v.
Bank,
73 (1880) 10 Neb. 556, 7 N. W. 311.
Love v. People's Compress Co., (1924) 137 Miss. 622, 102 So. 275;
Hubbard v. Southern P. R. Co., (C. C. A. 5th Cir. 1918) 256 Fed. 761;
New York C. R. Co. v. Bank, (N. D. Miss. 1911) 236 Fed. 562; Davis
v. First Natl Bank, (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) 245 S. W. 1009; National
Bank v. Hines, (1920) 112 Wash. 352, 192 Pac. 899; King v. Barbarin,
(C. C. A. 6th Cir. 1917) 249 Fed. 303; Alderman Bros. v. New York,
etc., R. Co., (1925) 102 Conn. 461, 129 At. 47; Babcock v. Peoples Say.
Bank,
(1889) 118 Ind. 212, 20 N. E. 732.
74
1t is a familiar argument that an estoppel does not create a cause
of action and therefore cannot properly be regarded as a basis of legal
liability. The legal consequences of estoppel by misrepresentation dG
not come within the scope of actionable misrepresentation. Estoppel is a
rule of evidence, not a cause of action. The same facts which establish the
estoppel may, of course, be ground for an action of misrepresentation;
but this is only an accident. Estoppel as such merely removes a barrier
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(b) Opinion or Comment. As in cases involving express
statements of specific fact, there are certain relationships in which
in the way of, or interposes an obstacle to a cause of action, or ground of
defense, which would otherwise fail or succeed in the respective cases."
(Bower, Actionable Misrepresentations (1927) 28, note d.) This explanation has been employed by English judges to avoid what they would otherwise regard as an inconsistency with the case of Derry v. Peek. (See
Low v. Bouverie, [1891] 3 Ch. 82, 101, and see Weisiger, Bases of Liability for Misrepresentation, (1930) 24 Il1. L. Rev. 866, 868.) But such
distinctions are largely ones of formal analysis. While estoppel may not
thus constitute a basis for liability, it is most certainly a basis for legal
responsibility.
An analytical distinction of this sort is useful and, therefore, justifiable for purposes of rationalization, that is, making intelligible and coherent existing phenomena. When, however, the logical form is regarded
as possessing validity in other respects, so that its implications become a
guide to action, its utility ceases and its abuse begins. This seems precisely
the situation in English law where an action in which the real basis of
liability is honestly and accurately presented may result in no recovery,
whereas a fictitious presentation will entitle the plaintiff to damages. (See
Tomkinson v. Balks Cons. Co., [1891] 2 Q. B. 614, in which a corporation
was estopped from asserting the defense of the forgery of a share certificate which the plainttiff had bought on the strength of a certificate
issued by the defendant. The case is discussed by Weisiger in [1930] 24
Ill. L. Rev. 866, 868 and Ewart, Estoppel [1900] 230 ff.) In other words,
"if the facts are stated naturally and in support of the real ground of
complaint the plaintiff will be beaten; whereas he will succeed if he state
the case artificially-asserting as his grievance that of which he cannot
complain." Ewart, Estoppel (1900) 236. This is indeed a sorry situation
when a premium is thus placed upon sham.
It seems clear that estoppel is one formula by which responsibility is
imposed for misrepresentation. Indeed, ifi English law, the judges sometimes concede that a cause of action is created between the parties. Thus,
Lord Justice Brett in Simm v. Anglo-American Tel. Co., (1879) 5 Q. 13.D.
207, after pointing out that although a warehouseman is not liable for
deceit under the doctrine of Derry v. Peek and, although he is estopped
to deny the plaintiff's right to the goods, cannot be compelled to deliver to
him the goods because they are actually owned by a third party, observed:
"In my view estoppel has no effect upon the real nature of the transaction:
it only creates a cause of action between the person in whose favor the
estoppel exists and the person who is estopped." There are, however,
judicial views to the contrary. To this conflict, Ewart thinks there is no
substance. "Whether an estoppel does or does not 'create a cause for
action,' is, to the writer, largely a matter of words." (p. 187.) "If the
subject be well understood," he continues (p. 187.), "it is a matter of
comparative indifference." The "understanding" necessary to make it a
matter of "comparative indifference" would seem to be some estimate of
the situations involving misrepresentations which indicate when the fraud
of Derry v. Peek is necessary to any legal responsibility, whatever the
form of words employed by the courts in imposing it, and when responsibility, whether explained as estoppel or otherwise, is imposed irrespective
of honesty and appropriate care.
It is highly significant that all the American cases in which an action
of deceit has been successfully maintained for innocent misrepresentation
have involved a type of factual situation in which the defendant is in a
position to know the facts which he states, while the plaintiff does not
have such an opportunity, or the representation is said to be made by the
defendant "as of his own personal knowledge" or "to his personal knowl,edge." See Chatham Furnace Co. v. Moffatt, (1888) 147 Mass. 403, 18

LAW OF MISREPRESENTATION

common assumptions are made that in no event does the opinion of
either party carry any misleading implications, either because one
party is in a superior position to know and judge, or because
the statement is couched in such positive terms that the other is
led to believe that the factual basis for the opinion offered is
known to be adequate. These cases include opinions as to the
financial responsibility of persons, the quality of material and
workmanship, the value, comparative and otherwise, of property,
the soundness of investments, the suitability and utility of property, and the validity of the legal title to property or other legal
right. 5 The defendant in these cases, because of his superior
N. E. 168; Hadcock v. Osmer, (1897) 153 N. Y. 604, 47 N. E. 923.
The same idea is expressed in the estoppel cases in a somewhat dif-

ferent form of words. The usual formula here is that "If both parties

have the same means of ascertaining the truth, there is no estoppel." See
Shean v. United States F. & G. Co., (1933) 263 Mich. 535, 248 N. W.
892; Charter Oak Inv. Co. v. Felker, (Mo. 1933) 60 S. W. (2d) 655; Fellows v. National Can Co., (C. C. A. 6th Cir. 1919) 257 Fed. 970; Fidelity
& Cas. Co. v. Palmer, (1917) 91 Conn. 410, 99 Atl. 1052; Cahoon v.
Beger, (1917) 31 Idaho 101, 168 Pac. 441; Live Stock Ins. Co. v. Stickler, (1917) 64 Ind. App. 191, 115 N. E. 691; Wood v. White Eagle Oil
Co., (1925) 220 Mo. App. 1004, 274 S. W. 894; W. C. Early Co. v. Williams, (1916) 135 Tenn. 249, 186 S. W. 102; Powers v. Trustees, (1919)
93 Vt.
75 220, 106 Atl. 836.
Broaddus v. Binkley, (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) 54 S. W. (2d) 586
(broker made positive assertion that tenants were financially responsible) ;
Conroy Piano Co. v. Pesch, (Mo. 1925) 279 S. W. 226 (vendor of piano
made positive assertions as to quality of material and workmanship, as
compared with other makes); Harris v. Miller, (1925) 196 Cal. 8, 235
Pac. 981 (agent of vendor told purchaser of land that there was a $4,000
orange crop on the place); Aldrich v. Worley, (1925) 200 Iowa 1009,
205 N. W. 851 (vendor told plaintiff vendee that rice farm was a choice
tract and suitable for raising rice); VIastings v. Swindle, (1920) 206 Mo.
App. 74, 226 S. W. 71 (vendor told vendee that timber on the land was
good, that cistern and ponds were lasting water, and that it was a good
buy); Homer v. Caldwell, (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) 256 S. W. 1023 (salesman told plaintiff that cotton seed had 90 per cent germinating quality);
Kerr v. Shurtleff, (1914) 218 Mass. 167, 105 N. E. 871 (statement by one
of authorities of college that college had authority to grant the degree of
D. M. D.); Edmonds v. Wilcox, (1918) 178 Cal. 222, 172 Pac. 1101
(bank's statement as to value of stock and that they regarded the stock
as ample security for its face value); F. H. Smith Co. v. Low, (1927)
57 App. D. C. 167, 18 F. (2d) 817 (positive assertion as to the value of
property sold plaintiff); Coleman v. Night Commander Lighting Co.,
(1928) 218 Ala. 196, 118 So. 377 (vendor told purchaser that lighting
plant would consume only 100 pounds of carbide in six months) ; Reinerz
v. American Piano Co., (1926) 254 Mass. 411, 150 N. E. 216 (vendors
told purchaser their phonograph was better than the Victor Phonograph) ;
Bockes v. Union Mutual Casualty Co., (Iowa 1929) 224 N. W. 771 (statement by insurance company's president that insured's accident policy was
void); Electric Paint & Varnish Co. v. Binghamton Woven Wire Spring
Co., (1929) 134 Misc. Rep. 638, 236 N. Y. S. 337 (vendor said that paint
would stand vibration without cracking, hardening or leaking); Roloff v.
Hundeby, (1930) 105 Cal. App. 645, 288 Pac. 702 (false statement by vendor
as to location of land in distant state, quantity of timber thereon, and character of soil).
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knowledge of the pertinent facts or means of knowledge thereof
or because of the positive character of his statement, is held to a
liability which is independent of the sincerity of his opinion or his
reasonableness in entertaining it.76 lie is required to insure the
plaintiff against loss resulting from error of judgment on his
part. Unless the defendant occupies a superior position to know
the facts pertinent to his expressed judgment, however, or unless
he has expressed his opinion in such dogmatic terms as fairly to
lead the plaintiff to conclude that his opinion is the accurate
inference from ascertained and verified facts, there is no liability
in expressing as his view what
unless the defendant is dishonest
7
he does not in fact believe.

These cases are most frequently dealt with as statements in
form expressions of opinion, but actually implied representations
of fact.7 , If the facts do not turn out to warrant the judgment, the
defendant is liable, although his statements were honestly made and
based upon facts which any reasonable man would have regarded as
an adequate basis therefor. He is actually held to warrant the
T6

Stress was placed upon these factors in the following cases:

Como

Orchard Land Co. v. Markham, (1918) 54 Mont. 348, 171 Pac. 274; Dilen-

breck v. Davis, (1919) 186 Iowa 30, 172 N. W. 184; Broaddus v. Binkley, (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) 54 S. W. (2d) 586; Maxwell Ice Co. v.

Brackett Co., (1921) 80 N. H. 236, 116 Atl. 34; Arnold v. Somers, (1918)

92 Vt. 512, 105 Atl. 260; Karls v. Drake, (1919) 168 Wis. 372, 170
N. W. 248; Keuge v. Ries, 3 (1917) 66 Ind. App. 610, 117 N. E. 262; La1rue
v. Barbee, (1919) 185 Ky. 54p 212 S. W. 142; Palmer v. Broetger, (1919)
41 S. D. 649, 172 N. W. 507; Hoptowit v. Brown, (1921) 115 Wash.
661, 198 Pac. 370; Dvorak v. Latimer, (1928) 91 Cal. App. 664, 267 Pac.
578; Maiden v. Fisher, (Mo. App. 1929) 17 S. W. (2d) 563; Mears v.
Accomac Banking Co., (1933) 160 Va. 311, 168 S. E. 740; Downing v.
Wimble, (1924) 97 Vt. 390, 123 Atl. 433; Schmidt v. Thompson, (1918)
140 Minn. 180, 167 N. W. 543; Hyde v. Albert E. Pierce & Co., (1934)
147 Or. 5, 31 p. (2d) 755; Smith v. Leeper, (1934) 189 Ark. 1051, 75 S. W.
(2d) 1012; Stumpf v. Lawrence, (1935) 4 Cal. App. (2d) 373, 40 P. (2d)
920; Benedict v. Dickens' Heirs, (1935) 119 Conn. 541, 177 Atl. 715.
77
State Trust Bank v. Hermosa Land Co., (1925) 30 N. M. 566. 240
Pac. 469 (estimate by vendor of number of cattle in herd) ; Sorrells v.
Clifford, (1922) 20 Ariz. 448, 204 Pac. 1013 (same); Ramsey v. Reyniersen, (1923) 200 Ky. 624, 255 S. W. 274 (statement by defendant that
third party would pay obligation if plaintiff would lend him money);
Boston Gas Co. v. Folsom, (1921) 237 Mass. 565 (opinion of vendor's
agent as to comparative cost of operating gas boiler) ; Vian v. Hilberg,

(1923) 111 Neb. 232, 196 N. W. 153 (opinion as to third person's credit) ;

Podolsky v. Sandier, (App. Term 1916) 161 N. Y. S. 363 (opinion by
defendant as to date of his graduation) ; Beckley v. Archer, (1925) 74
Cal. App. 598, 241 Pac. 422 (opinion as to cows with calf) ; Warren Say.
Bank v. Foley, (1928) 294 Pa. St. 176, 144 At. 84 (opinion as to credil
and competence of third person).
7
8See the anlysis of the court in Kathan v. Comstock, (1909) 140 Wis
427, 122 N. W. 1044; Armstrong v. Rachow, (1919) 205 Mich. 168, 171
N. W. 389.
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existence of facts which will justify the opinion in the sense that
the expected advantages of the transaction accrue to the plaintiff.""
This absolute liability does not exist where the basis for the
opinion is stated or is otherwise known to the plaintiff at the
time. In such a case, the defendant's statement cannot reasonably
be regarded as anything other than his opinion, based on the known
facts, as to probabilities or future developments, and words of
warranty are necessary to make him an insurer. \Vlhether he is
liable if, though honest, his prophecies were not reasonable, or
whether he is liable if he was insincere in the expression of his
judgment, or whether he is not liable even for fraudulent misrepresentations of his opinion depends upon other factors which
determine the justification for the plaintiff's assumption of his
competence or honesty.
Business may be conducted with the business risks all on one
side, if the price of such security is paid. In the absence of express
agreement, however, the allocation of such risks depends upon
the basis of the transaction as revealed by the relation of the
parties and the tacit assumptions thereby justified. WVhile a party
to a transaction is not always assured by law that he will get all
that he thinks he is getting in the way of a good bargain, he is
assured that the transaction will be conducted on the basis of his
justifiable assumptions. When, therefore, the existence of certain
facts, rather than the other party's honest or even reasonable belief
in their existence, constitutes the very subject of the sale, the
absence of such facts is fatal to the validity of the transaction.
The party who is prejudiced by the non-existence of such facts
may hold the other party to a warrantor's liability.
This situation may be illustrated by a misrepresentation of
title or other legal right which is the subject of a transaction. If
the facts are thoroughly known by both parties, an assertion of
title as a legal conclusion is mere opinion and the vendee may
properly be held to purchase a precarious legal claim, provided
there has been no actual fraud. The subject of the sale is not
the legal title or right, but such claim thereto as the vendor may
have. The plaintiff must rely upon his own judgment, and not
79
In some of these cases, the contract measure of damages is applied.
thus carrying the theory of the plaintiff's "justifiable expectations" to its

logical limits. Long v. Freeman, (1934) 228 Mo. App. 1002, 69 S. W.
(2d) 973; Stumpf v. Lawrence, (1935) 4 Cal. App. (2d) 373, 40 Pac. (2d)
920. In some cases the measure of damages is immaterial as the amount
of recovery would be the same under either. In other cases the problem
is apparently not considered.
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that of the defendant. Even a misrepresentation by the latter as
to what his opinion may be cannot justifiably be relied upon save
in exceptional circumstances, although many courts allow restitution. The deal is presumably consummated with proper allowances
for the doubts or chances as to the validity of the title unless the
price of a warranty is paid.80
Where the facts are not known to the plaintiff and where the
defendant is in a much better position to know them, or although
the facts are equally accessible to both, the defendant assures the
plaintiff of the validity of his asserted title or right, it may fairly
be held that the subject of the transaction has become not such
claims as the defendant may turn out to have had, but a valid
claim or title, and the parties will be held to the assumed terms
and conditions of the bargain. Stability of transactions requires
not only that the purchaser of the non-existent legal right be permitted to rescind the bargain, but that the vendor make good in
damages the invalidity of the claim. The parties should be put in
the same position as though the thing purchased was as represented.
The defendant is accordingly held to a warrantor's liability.8'
This is always the case in a sale of chattels or a contract for
such sale, even though nothing is said as to the vendor's title.
Usually, the facts upon which the seller's title depends are known
only to him. The very offer of the goods for sale is a representation both of title and of the material facts upon which title depends.8 2 He is held, therefore, to an implied warranty of title unless,
as in the case of a judicial sale, the conditions of the transaction are
such that it is understood that he sells only such interest as he may
have.8 3 Much the same thing may be said as to a contract for the
8
oSee
81

infra, p. 1003.
Kathan v. Comstock, (1909) 140 Wis. 427, 122 N. W. 1044; Hoptowit v. Brown, (1921) 115 Wash. 661, 198 Pac. 370; Bockes v. Union
Mutual Casualty Co., (Iowa 1929) 224 N. W. 771; Allison v. Win. Doerflinger Co., (1932) 208 Wis. 70, 242 N. W. 558; Koon v. Pioneer-Pyramid Co., (1935) 175 S. C. 117, 178 S. E. 503; Wood v. Roeder, (1897)
50 Neb. 476, 70 N. W. 21; Texas Cotton Products Co. v. Derney Bros.,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1903) 78 S. W. 557; Commercial Say. Bank v. Kietges,
(1928) 206 Iowa 90, 219 N. W. 44.
82Eichholz v. Bannister, (1864) 17 C. B. (N. S.) 708; Gould v. Bourgeois, (1889) 51 N. J. L. 361, 18 Atl. 64; Perkins v. Whelan, (1875)
116 Mass. 542; Uniform Sales Act, sec. 13; Vold, Sales (1931) 448; Restatement83of Restitution, sec. 24, (1).
"Normally, the seller of a chattel warrants his title, and the purchaser
has the alternative of maintaining an action for breach of contract or of
getting the return of his consideration. On the other hand, the transaction may be conducted on the basis that even though no title passes by the
transaction the purchaser is to take the risk. This is the normal inference
in sales on execution by a sheriff or other officer, not requiring confirma-
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sale of land. Unless otherwise stipulated, usage requires the seller
to furnish a marketable title.86 It is otherwise, however, as to an
actual sale of land. Here the assumption is that the vendor sells
only such title as he may have, unless it is provided otherwise by
the inclusion in a deed of a warranty of title. If the grantor,
prior to the conveyance, makes express misrepresentations of fact
with respect to his title, although he does not thereby become
liable in an action for misrepresentation, unless he knew of the
falsity thereof, nevertheless the vendee is entitled to restitution
4
upon repudiation of the transaction.1
tion

by a court. In these sales, unless it is otherwise agreed, the purchaser
assumes the risk that the subject matter is not owned by the execution
debtor and hence if there is failure of title, he is not entitled to recover
the purchase price from the officer, or from the creditor or other beneficiary in the absence of fraud or misrepresentation." Restatement of Restitution, sec. 24, Comment d. The word "misrepresentation" in this comment evidently refers to some misrepresentation of fact other than the
tacit misrepresentation of title implicit in the proffer of sale.
84
Wesley v. Wells, (1900) 177,U. S. 370, 20 Sup. Ct. 661, 44 L Ed. 810;
Messer-Johnson Realty Co. v. Security Savings & Loan Co., (1922) 208
Ala. 541, 94 So. 734; Heaton v. Nelson, (1920) 69 Colo. 320, 194 Pac.
614; Brown v. Davis, (1925) 15 Del. Ch. 37, 131 Ad. 142; Bell v. Stadler.
(1918) 31 Idaho 568, 174 Pac. 129; Hale v. Cravener, (1889) 128 I1. 408,
21 N. E. 534; Smith v. Turner, (1875) 50 Ind. 367; Shrick v. Pierce.
(1856) 3 Iowa 350; Linscott v. Moseman, (1911) 84 Kan. 541, 114 Pac.
1088; Sibley v. Spring, (1835) 12 Me. 460; Levy v. Iroquois Building
Co., (1894) 80 Md. 300, 30 Atl. 707; Swan v. Drury, (1839) 22 Pick.
(Mass.) 485; Drake v. Barton, (1872)
18 Minn. 462; Townshend v.
Goodfellow, (1889) 40 Minn. 312, 41 N. W. 1056; Green v. Ditsch.
(1899) 143 Mo. 1, 44 S. W. 799; Ogg v. Herman, (1924) 71 Mont. 10.
227 Pac. 476; Breitman v. Jaehnel, (1927) 100 N. J. Eq. 559, 135 Ati. 915;
Fleming v. Burnham, (1885) 100 N. Y. 1, 2 N. E. 905; Rife v. Lybarger.
(1892) 49 Ohio St. 422, 31 N. E. 768; Speakman v. Forepaugh. (1863)
44 Pa. St. 363; Miller v. Bronson, (1904) 26 R. I. 62, 58 Ad. 257.
84a"In the absence of a provision otherwise, normally a contract for
the sale of land includes inferentially an agreement that the seller is to
furnish a marketable title and if money has been paid upon such a contract in anticipation of the receipt of title it may be recovered if such a
title is not furnished, as in the case of any other contract which is unperformed by the payee. This is true although the seller does not contract
to give a warranty of title.
"If, however, after a contract the buyer, whether or not entitled to
more,
accepts from the seller a deed of a freehold interest containing no
warranties,
usage indicates that the buyer accepts the risk that the seller
had no title or a defective one, and in the absence of fraud or misrepresentation [otherwise than that which is implicit in the proffer of sale and
mere act of transfer], the buyer cannot thereafter recover money which
he paid either before or after the conveyance.... Although an express misrepresentation of facts. as to ownership prior to a conveyance, even though
innocently made, is sufficient to make the transaction voidable, the representations of ownership inferred from contracting to sell or from making a conveyance, if innocently made, are not such misrepresentations as
make the transaction voidable. If, however, the seller knows facts from
which he realizes that he has no title or only a doubtful title and also
has reason to believe that the buyer does not know these facts, his failure
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There is, in these rules relating to the sale of land, more
than mere technical and fine spun distinctions. They cut to the
very heart of the social policy of the law of misrepresentation.
Subtle differences in psychological attitudes seem to require the
differences in legal rules. A contract of sale, in the absence of
explicit agreement, "naturally" carries the implication of a valid
title as the subject of the deal. Men do not ordinarily contemplate
any other kind of "land" sale. The practical viewpoint of the
layman or even the real estate operator is that a contract for
"sale of land" calls for a valid title to the land. Unless the stipulations or the known conditions suggest something different, the
parties normally regard complete ownership as the subject of the
transaction. The deal fails if the title fails. On the other hand,
the practice of requiring covenants of warranty in deeds to land,
sold on the assumption that the vendor transfers a title in fee
simple absolute, and the uniformly recognized difference in the
value of a quit-claim deed negate any such implication from the
actual conveyance itself. Unless the vendor represents otherwise,
the fact that no warranty is included in the deed indicates that
the vendee, not the vendor, assumes the risk of defective title.
The price is adjusted on this basis. The vendee, in the absence
of assurance from his vendor, must, and normally does, make his
own investigation and pays a price that he thinks the chances of
validity justify. If, however, the vendor, although not by formal
warranty, assures validity, the implied assumption of risk is
recognized by an action for restitution. The vendee's failure to
investigate facts presumably better known to the vendor than himself will not forfeit this protection. The parties now purport to
consummate the transaction with reference to a valid title and,
although both are innocently mistaken, the law will not, as
between the parties, substitute some other deal. The vendee
cannot enforce the warranty by direct action for misrepresentation, but he can escape the bargain which his vendor mistakenly
substituted for the one both thought they were making.
V.
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In many relations resulting from business transactions, al-

though a party is not entitled to rely upon the absolute truth of
to reveal such facts is fraudulent non-disclosure and the buyer is entitled
to restitution, unless he also knows the facts or unless the agreement is
that each is to rely only upon his own knowledge." Restatement of Restitution, Sec. 24, Comment e.
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representations or infallibility of 'judgment of the other party
and hence to expect the other to make good in the event of the
falsity of the statements or invalidity of opinion, he is entitled
to expect more than mere honesty and sincerity. He quite justifiably expects a certain standard of care and competence from the
other as to such representations or opinion. Many transactions are
conducted on the assumption that he who makes the important
statements upon which the parties proceed is reasonably qualified
to make such statements and that he has employed reasonable diligence to ascertain their accuracy.
Since the failure to employ reasonable competence and skill
in ascertaining the truth of representations or the basis of opinion
involves a form of negligence, the problem is amenable to the
usual analysis employed in negligence cases, namely, breach of the
duty to exercise care. Here, at once, there is noted a significant
distinction between the duty to exercise care with respect to the
person and tangible property of another, and the duty to exercise
care and competence not to mislead another in connection with a
business transaction. In the former case, there is always the negative duty not to create an unreasonable risk, that is, not to act so
as unreasonably to expose others to risk of harm. It is onl)
with respect to affirmative duties, that is, duties to assist others
to escape harm, that some special relationship between then is
necessary. This distinction, a common one in American law since
Professor Bohlen's significant work on affirmative obligations,"
seems not to be recognized in England where judges and writers
are still puzzled over Brett's formula in Heaven v. Pender" and
the apparent duplication in the test for duty and its breach.,
In the case of liability for negligent misrepresentations, however, there is no such broad negative duty. Whereas one is always
under a duty not, by his act, to threaten unreasonable harm to
another's person or tangible property, there must be some special
85Bohlen, Affirmative Obligations in the Law of Torts, (1905) 53 Am.
L. Reg. 209, Bohlen, Studies in Torts 33; Bohlen. The Moral Duty to
Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, (1908) 56 U. Pa. L. Rev. 217,
Bohlen, Studies in Torts 291.
86(1883) L. R. 11 Q. B. D. 503.
87
See Lord Atldn, in Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] A. C. 562, 580,
discussing the formula developed by Brett, M. R. in Heaven v. Pender,
(1883) 11 Q. B. D. 503, 52 L. J. Q. B. 702, 49 L. T. 357, 47 J. P. 709.
Also consult the discussions in the eighth edition of Salmond on Torts
(8th ed. 1934) 456-459. Compare the above with Green, The Duty Problem, (1928) 28 Col. L. Rev. 1014; (1929) 29 Col. L. Rev. 235; Green,
Judge and Jury, (1930) Ch. 3 and 4, especially at pp. 66-67.
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relationship between the parties to create such a duty in respect
to misinformation negligently given.68 The reasons for this are
clear. The distinction brings the law into conformity with common
sense and general notions of fairness and propriety. The physical
affairs of life are conducted on the assumption that everyone will
so regulate his conduct as not unduly to expose another to risk of
harm to person or property. Automobiles are operated in congested traffic upon this assumption. Houses and. other structures
are erected and demolished, industry is carried on, and, in short,
all the physical activities of a complex society are carried on upon
such mutual assumptions. One expects and is entitled to expect
such precautions from others as will make their conduct reasonably
safe in this respect. The law, therefore, imposes the general duty
of care. It is otherwise, however, as to the use of language which,
if relied upon, is likely to affect adversely another's pecuniary
interest in a business transaction. No one is entitled to expect
diligence or care from one, a stranger to a transaction and entirely
disinterested therein, who makes casual statements or gives gratuitous advice with respect thereto. Here is conduct which is likely
to cause loss if relied upon, but one at most can expect no more
than honesty in such situations. One should not assume that any
degree of care has been employed to insure the accuracy of such
gratuitous information.
If, however, the person who makes the representations does
S8 That a "special relationship" is required in the case of negligent

language is recognized by English writers. They apparently assume the
same necessity as to active negligence otherwise than by language. Thus,
in Salmond, Torts (8th ed. 1934) 455:
"There is no liability for negligence unless there is in the particular
case a legal duty to take care, and this duty must be one which is owed
to the plaintiff himself and not merely to others. 'The ideas of negligence and duty are strictly correlative,' says Bowen, L. J., 'and there is
no such thing as negligence in the abstract; negligence is simply neglect
of some care which we are bound to exercise towards somebody.' This
duty of carefulness is not universal; it does not extend to all occasions,
and all persons, and all modes of activity. There are cases in which.

although there is a duty not to caiuse harm intentionally, there is no corresponzding duty to take care not to cause it accidentally. Thits. I must
not deceive another to his own hurt by wilfully telling him lies, but I am
commoldy under no obligation to take care that the statements which I
make to him are true [italics ours]. So a man may be under a duty of
care towards one person, and yet in the same matter and on the same
occasion under no duty of care towards another. The occupier of premises is bound towards persons lawfully entering on them to take care
that they are free from concealed danger, but he owes no such duty to the
trespasser. 'English law does not recognize a duty in the air, so to speak;
that is, a duty to undertake that no one shall suffer from one's carelessness.'"
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so in the pursuit of a business or profession which requires special
competence, he should have the competence thus professed. So
too, if the information is given in the capacity of one in the business
of supplying such information, that care and dliigence should be
exercised which is compatible with the particular business or
profession involved. Those who deal with such persons do so
because of the advantages which they expect to derive from this
special competence. The law, therefore, may well predicate on
such a relationship, the duty of care to insure the accuracy and
validity of the information."9 If the person misled has dealt
directly with the other and a contract exists between them, there
is no doubt of the existence of the duty. There is recent authority,
however, that the duty exists toward one who, though not in
privity with the person supplying the misinformation, was known
at the time it was given to be the person for whose guidance it
was furnished. 90
89
"One who in the course of his business or profession supplies information for the guidance of others in their business transactions is subject to liability for harm caused to them by their reliance upon the information if
(a) he fails to exercise that care and competence in obtaining and
communicatiing the information which its recipient is justified in expecting, and
(b) the harm is suffered
(i) by the person or one of the class of persons for whose guidance the information was supplied, and
(ii) because of his justifiable reliance upon it in a transaction in which
it was intended to influence his conduct or in a transaction substantially
identical therewith." Restatement of the Law of Torts, Tentative Draft
No. 12, sec. 628.
90
Glanzer v. Shepard, (1923) 233 N. Y. 236, 135 N. E. 275, 23
A. L. R. 1425 (public weigher, ordered and paid by seller, negligently
certified weight of beans, so that buyer suffered loss); Doyle v. Chatham
Bank, (1930) 253 N. Y. 369, 171 N. E. 574 (bank trustee of bonds negligently certified them) ; Tardos v. Bozant, (1846) 1 La. Ann. 199 (inspector of meat made negligent report as to its quality); Pearson v. Purkett.
(1834) 15 Pick. (Mass.) 264 (same) ; Mulroy v. Wright, (1932) 185
Mich. 84, 240 N. W. 116 (officer liable for negligently certifying there were
no assessments against realty).
In the following cases notaries public, justices of the peace, and other
like officers were held liable: State ex rel. Gardner v. Webber, (1914)
177 Mo. App. 60, 164 S. W. 184; Figuers v. Fly, (1917) 137 Tenn. 358,
193 S. W. 117; Hatton v. Holmes, (1893) 97 Col. 208, 31 Pac. 1131;
Rhodes v. Franz, (1916) 173 App. Div. 774, 160 N. Y. S. 66; People
ex rel Curtiss v. Colby, (1878) 39 Mich. 456.
In the following cases recovery was denied: New England Bond
& Govt. Co. v. Brock, (1930) 270 Mass. 107, 169 N. E. 803 (notary public); Kahl v. Love, (1874) 37 N. J. L. 5 (officer not liable for false certificate as to payment of taxes); Day v. Reynolds, (1885) 23 Hun. (N.Y.)
131 (clerk making certificate as to state of record); National Iron &
Steel Co. v. Hunt, (1924) 312 Ill. 245, 143 N. E. 833 (company expert
inspectors held not liable to subsequent purchaser of rails, since not in
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(a) Facts. The problem in the cases involving negligent
misrepresentations of fact is whether the parties deal on the
assumption that reasonable care has been employed to assure
the truth of the representations made, and whether in the light of
common business practice, the relationship of the parties is such
that these assumptions are justifiable. In other words, is a party
who enters into a business transaction entitled to expect care and
diligence from one who, though not employed by him, nevertheless
in a professional or business capacity, with knowledge of the purpose for which it is to be used, furnishes important information
for the guidance of the parties?
The New York court of appeals answered this question in the
affirmative in Glanzer v. Shepard," the case of a public weigher
who furnished an erroneous weight certificate upon which the
plaintiff, who had not employed him, overpaid the vendor of a
quantity of beans. It decided otherwise in the case of a certified
public accountant who negligently furnished a financial statement
upon which the plaintiff, who had not employed him, advanced
money to an insolvent corporationY2 In Le Lievre v. Gould,
the English court denied recovery to a mortgagee who had advanced money on the strength of a surveyor's certificate furnished
by the defendant which, because of negligence, contained misinformation as to the amount of work done by a builder in the
erection of a house. Lord Esher and Bowen, L. J., each had distinguished the decision in Heaven v. Pender94 on the ground that
the formula laid down in that case applied only to physical harm
caused to persons within the danger zone.91
These conflicting decisions and the discussions of the courts
indicate that the "duty" question is a crystallization in technical
terms of the broad problem of what parties in the relationship in
question are entitled to expect from each other.

Lord Atkin, in a

recent decision in which the House of Lords considered at length
the duty problem, observed:
"At present, I content myself with pointing out that in English Law there must be and is some general conception of relations
privity) ; Landell v. Lybrand, (1919) 264 Pa. St. 406, 107 AtI. 783 (public
accountant negligently reported on corporate affairs and purchaser of stock
relied on the report).
91(1920) 233 N. Y. 236, 135 N. E. 275, 23 A. L. R. 1425.
92
Ultrarnares Corporation v. Touche, (1931) 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. I.
441, 74 A. L. R. 1139.
93[1893] 1 Q. B. 491, 68 L. T. 626.
94(1883) L. R. 11Q. B. D. 503.
95
See note 97, infra.
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giving rise to a duty of care, of which the particular cases found in
the books are but instances. The liability for negligence, whether
you style it such or treat it as in other systems as a species of
'culpa' is no doubt based upon a general public sentiment of
moral wrongdoing for which the offender must pay." '
The issue in the case of a negligent misrepresentation upon
which the court must exercise its judgment, then, is whether the
parties in the type of transaction in question are in such a relationship as to bring them within "a general public sentiment of wrongdoing" if they fail to exercise care; whether business practice and
the common assumptions which constitute the tacit psychological
basis of their dealings are sufficiently important to justify the
imposition of a legal duty to employ care in making material representations.
It is to be expected that the judgments of courts should vary
as to what situations come within this description. The English
courts are of opinion that only when the parties are in contractual
relation are they entitled to expect such care and diligence?9 The
New York court of appeals is apparently of the opinion that it is
unnecessary that there be such a legally formal relationship as a
binding contract between the parties, but that what can be called
the "business intimacy" of the parties may be sufficient to entitle
one party to expect care and diligence if the other is engaged in
the business of furnishing such information, and knows the particular use for which it is furnished and the particular person for
whom it is furnished.
This problem appears further in the cases involving the liability of an abstractor for a negligent report as to the title to land.
In some jurisdictions, it seems that unless the plaintiff was the
9
v. Stevenson, [1932] A. C. 580.
96Donoghue
7
1n Le Lievre v. Gould, [1893] 1 Q. B. 491, 68 L T. 626. Lord
Esher said: "What duty is there between two people that one should not
be negligent towards the other when there is no contract between them?"
Smith, L. J., remarked: "The defendant says he owed no duty to
the plaintiffs, and it seems to me he is right, unless the plaintiffs prove
that he was bound to them by contract to make true representations in
the certificates."
Both judges thereafter distinguished the decision in Heaven v.Pender.
"It establishes this point," explained the former, "that under certain circumstances, when two people are so physically near to other other that
one might cause the other a personal injury or an injury to his property,
in such a case a duty lies upon him to take reasonable care not to cause
to the other any injury to his person or his property." The latter said of
Heaven v. Pender, "That case relates only to the duty cast upon the
owner of property or chattels to take care that his property or chattels
do not cause any injury to persons in their neighborhood, and it has no
application to the present case."
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person who had employed the abstractor there can be no recovery.96 In several jurisdictions, however, although the plaintiff had not entered into a contract with the defendant, he may
recover if the latter, at the time of supplying the certificate or
report, knew the person who would rely upon it and the transaction in which it would be used.9
In some states, statutes go still
further and eliminate the necessity for knowledge by the abstractor
of the person and transaction; it is enough if he knows that the
certificate is likely to result in loss to someone if the information
is incorrect. 100
Cases involving the doctrine of estoppel disclose similar situations. As already noted,100a in certain situations one is estopped
to assert the falsity of a misrepresentation although he acted
honestly and carefully. These were relations in which the estoppel
denier was in a position which would ordinarily insure the accuracy
of his statements if he were honest and careful, and for this
reason the other party properly expected and relied upon the accuracy thereof. There are other situations in which there is no
estoppel unless there has been negligence and, indeed, still others
in which fraud is required.101 In some of the "standing by"
98
Peterson v. Gales, (1926) 191 Wis. 137, 210 N. W. 407; 47 A. L. R.
956; Thomas v. Guarantee Title & Lbr. Co., (1910) 81 Ohio St. 432,
91 N. E. 183, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1210; Zweigardt v. Birdseye, (1894)
57 Mo. App. 462. Some cases say there must be some privity, of contract
or otlwrwise [italics ours], between the parties. Dundee Mortgage & Trust
Investment Co. v. Hughes, (C. C. Oregon 1884) 20 Fed. 39; National Say.
Bank99v. Ward, (1880) 100 U. S. 195, 25 L. Ed. 621.
Peabody Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Houseman, (1879) 89 Pa. St. 261,
33 Am. Rep. 757 contradicting the language of Kellogg v. Harmer, (1865)
6 Phila. 90; Denton v. Title Co., (1904) 112 Tenn. 320, 79 S. W. 799;
Decatur Land, Loan & Abstract Co. v. Rutland, (Tex. Civ. App. 1916)
185 S. W. 1064; Brown v. Sims, (1899) 22 Ind. App. 317, 72 Am. St.
Rep. 308, 53 N. E. 779; Economy Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. West Jersey Title
Co., (1899) 64 N. J. L 27, 44 Atl. 854; Anderson v. Spriestersbach, (1912)
69 Wash. 393, 125 Pac. 166 (but see the language in Bremerton Develop.
Co. v. Title Trust Co., (1912) 67 Wash. 268, 121 Pac. 69) ; also see Shine
v. Nash Abstract & Invest. Co., (1928) 217 Ala. 498, 117 So. 47, and
Ohmart v. Citizens Savings & Tr. Co., (1924) 82 Ind. App. 219, 145 N. E.
577, for language supporting the proposition stated.
lOoCases construing such statutes are: Goldberg v. Sisseton Loan &
Title Co., (1909) 24 S. D. 49, 140 Am. St. Rep. 775, 123 N. W. 266;
Washington Co. Abstr. Co. v. Harris, (1915) 48 Okla. 577, 149 Pac. 1075;
Sackett v. Rose, (1916) 55 Okla. 398, 154 Pac. 1177; Merrill v. Fremont
Abstract Co., (1924) 39 Idaho 238, 227 Pac. 34; Crook v. Chilvers, (1916)
99 Neb. 685, 157 N. W. 617; Arnold v. Barner, (1914) 91 Kan. 768,
139 Pac. 404.
loaSupra, note 74.
01
It is believed that the estoppel cases show that there are situations
where there is no liability without proof of fraud, such fraud as would
come within the rule of Derry v. Peek; that there are other cases, that,
while not requiring fraud, will fail without a showing of some fault or
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cases, although some courts seem to require actual fraud, negligence
is really enough to work the estoppel to assert title. This title
is sometimes couched in terms of "constructive" fraud or "negligence which amounts to fraud." Thus, in a New York case,2'- it
was said that "actual fraud, or fault or negligence equivalent to
fraud" is necessary to an estoppel. "While it is frequently said
that fraud is an essential element of estoppel," said the Missouri
court, 0 3 "this must be taken to mean fraud either actual or constructive."
There are a number of situations in which what has been
called "assisted misrepresentation"' 0 4 is actionable only when negligence is proved. Included in this class are cases of misrepresentation by the use of various commiercial documents. Thus, the maker
of. a negotiable instrument is under a duty to employ care not to
create a situation which a third person may utilize to defraud another,'0 5 as by leaving blank spaces in the instrument.
There are still other situations in which a person is responsible
for the misrepresentation of someone else, because by his negligence he is estopped to deny that it was his own misrepresentation,
such as one who carelessly assists a third person to misrepresent
negligence on the defendant's part. There is a third class where neither
fraud nor negligence is required." Weisiger, Bases of Liability for Misrepresentation, (1930) 24 Ill. L. Rev. 866, 870.
Ewart apparently adopts a contrary view. He concedes that in some
situations negligence is necessary to work an estoppel (see chapter IX).
but he does not believe that fraud is ever necessary. See chapter VIII,
pp. 84-85 in which he criticizes the following passage from Bigelow on
Estoppel: "Estoppel arising in virtue of a misrepresentation is the converse of an action of deceit. The property or interest claimed by reason of
the estoppel corresponds to the damages sought in the action of deceit; and
in order to make good the claim of estoppel the same things, it should
seem, are requisite that are necessary to the maintenance of the action mentioned." To this, Ewart objects, saying, "Nor can the present writer agree
that for 'estoppel the same things are requisite as in the action for deceit.
The latter, as -we have just seen, must be based upon fraud and nothing
short of that will suffice.' In estoppel on the other hand as we shall
abundantly see, a perfectly innocent misrepresentation, or even innocent
assistance rendered to a misrepresentation of another peron, may be quite
sufficient for estoppel."
Ewart, of course, had reference to the rigid adherence by English courts
to the rule of Derry v. Peek, requiring scienter in an action for deceit.
A large number of American cases have allowed what wvas in form an
action02of deceit although the misrepresentation was innocently made.
Trenton Banking Co. v. Duncan, (1881) 86 N. Y. 221.
103Palmer v. Welch, (1913) 171 Mo. App. 581, 154 S. W. 433.
04
Ewart, Estoppel, (1900) 101.
05 Snyder v. Corn Exch. Bank, (1908) 221 Pa. St. 599, 70 Ati. 876;
Young v. Grote, (1827) 4 Bing. 253; Brown v. Reed, (1875) 79 Pa. St. 370;
Timbel v. Garfield Nat'l Bank, (1907) 121 App. Div. 870, 106 N. Y. S. 497.
See cases collected for and against this view in (1917) 31 Harv. L Ed. 779.
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an authority to act for him as agent, 106 or one who negligently fails
to discover the forgery of a check which a bank has charged to
his account." 7
(b) Opinion. In many relations, while the plaintiff may not
justifiably expect infallibility of judgment on the part of the defendant, he is nevertheless justified in expecting a reasonable degree of competency in the formulation of the judgment and the
care with which the data upon which the judgment is based have
been collected. These include situations in which the plaintiff has
knowledge of the factual basis for the opinion and those in which
such basis is not revealed. Indeed, it may include situations in
which the plaintiff himself furnishes the facts upon which the defendant bases his judgment. This liability, like that for negligent
misrepresentations of fact, is based upon the negligence of him who
honestly makes a representation of an opinion which is unsound as
measured by the test of the reasonable man in the defendant's
position. In terms of the analysis usually accorded problems involving negligence, the defendant has failed to exercise the duty
of care which the law imposes upon him. This duty exists if the
defendant by reason of his business or professional experience
should be especially qualified to form an opinion."' A person, by
engaging in such a business or profession, purports to offer to the
public those qualifications normally expected from members of the
particular calling. His services are sought because of the assunption of special skill. A failure to exercise the skill and competency
compatible with the particular profession subjects such a person to
liability for negligence. While the plaintiff must bear the risk
of loss resulting from reasonable errors in the performance of
these services by the defendant, he is not required to bear the
risk of unreasonable error in judgment.
106
Thomson v. Shelton, (1896) 49 Neb. 644, 68 N. W. 1055; Heald v.
89 Cal. 632, 27 Pac. 67.
Henley,
07 (1891)
1 Hardy v. Chesapeake, (1879) 51 Md. 562; Bank of Black Rock v.
Johnson, etc. Co., (1921) 148 Ark. 11, 229 S. W. 1; Morgan v. United
States M'tge Co., (1913) 208 N. Y. 218, 101 N. E. 871; Tri-Bullion Co. v.
Curtis, (1919) 186 App. Div. 613, 174 N. Y. S. 830. See Arant, Forged
Checks-Duty of Depositor to his Bank, (1922) 31 Yale L. J. 598.
1os"Where the information consists of an opinion upon facts supplied by
the recipient or otherwise known to him, the recipient is entitled to expect a
careful consideration of the facts and competence in arriving at an intelligent
judgment thereon. Where the supplier undertakes to give an opinion upon
facts to be ascertained by him, the recipient is entitled to expect that he
will make a careful investigation and will also give careful consideration
to the data thereby discovered and will exercise competence in drawing intelligent inferences therefrom." Restatement of Torts, Tentative Draft No.
13, sec. 628, Comment d.
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Cases involving the liability of appraisers, attorneys, and
others who render similar services in a professional capacity come
within this rule. 1"9 The principle is strictly analogous to negligent
misrepresentations of fact"0 made by persons in similar relations
and the same variation in the application of the principle by the
courts is apparent. As in cases involving negligent misrepresentation of fact, some courts take the position that no duty of care
is owing unless the defendant knows the transaction in which the
information is to be used and the persons for whose guidance
it is intended."' In such cases, the defendant undertakes only to
render service. No one expects such service to be a warranty
against loss. If the defendant's service involves furnishing an
opinion as to the business risks of a transaction, no one could
reasonably exepect more than diligence in ascertaining data, not
furnished by the client, and reasonable competency in the formation of judgment.
(c) Comparison of liability for innocent and neglig nt misinformation. Considered in the light of the cases imposing liability for innocent misrepresentations, does it appear that the
cases involving negligently given misinformation disclose a rational
policy? It is believed that in many respects they disclose a policy
that is thoroughly understandable. In the first place, most cases
of liability -for innocent misrepresentation disclose the formal
stamp of a contractual relationship between the parties. Moreover, usually the case is one involving a sale, if not between the
plaintiff and the defendant, then between plaintiff and a third person. And finally, in every case of liability for innocent representation, the misinformation was one of fact "susceptible of accurate
knowledge," or an expression of opinion capable of adequate factual support. Moreover, the statements were made either by one
who had peculiar means of ascertaining pertinent data or by one
' 09 Anderson v. Spriestersbach, (1912) 69 Wash. 393, 125 Pac. It(A;
Brown v. Sims, (1899) 22 Ind. App. 317, 53 N. E. 779; Decatur Land.
etc., Co. v. Rutland, (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) 185 S. %V. 1064; Dickle v.
Abstract Co., (1890) 89 Tenn. 431; Economy Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. West
Jersey Title Co., (1899) 64 N. J. L. 27, 44 At. 854. The South African
Court, in Perlman v. Zontendyk, [1934] S. A. L. R., Cape Prov. Div. 151,
apparently takes the position that it is enough to justify the expectation
of care if one of the parties is in the business of furnishing such information
although he does not know the particular transaction in which it will be
used nor the particular person who will use it.
"10 Supra, p. 982.
"'See Kahl v. Love, (1874) 37 N. J. L. 1874; Landell v. Lybrand.
(1919) 264 Pa. St. 406, 107 Atl. 783; Savings Bank v. Ward, (1879) 100
U. S. 195, 25 L. Ed. 621.
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whose position made possible complete knowledge and whose statements fairly implied that he had it.
In many of the cases involving negligent misrepresentations,
there is no contract between the parties to the action, and, although there is frequently a sale between the plaintiff and a third
person, the information sometimes consists as much of a matter
of judgment as of fact. The misinformation which is likely to
cause loss may consist of a failure to discover pertinent data, or
an unreasonable appraisal of accurate and complete data."' Moreover, what is equally important, the cases involving innocent misrepresentation disclose situations in which the defendant professes
complete knowledge of the facts or normally could be expected to
know them without any special investigation. He is usually the
owner of land, chattels, or intangible property which he is selling
to the plaintiff, or he is a cashier or other officer in a bank or other
corporation, so that the facts stated are not only susceptible of accurate knowledge, but he can be expected to have it, most certainly if he makes special claims to it. In the case of a public
weigher, surveyor, accountant, abstractor, appraiser or other such
person, the party relying on the information knows that the
defendant obtained and furnished it only because he was employed by some one to do so. The information was obtained not
from personal experience for personal use, but only tb pass on to
some one else as a matter of business or professional activity. In
the one case, the information is given and accepted "as of the
personal knowledge" of the supplier. In the other, it is given and
accepted as the reasonable belief of the person supplying it after
a reasonably careful and skillful investigation.
When a person buys a chattel or stock in a corporation, he buys
it "as represented" by the vendor or, by some decisions, by an
officer or director in the corporation. He is justified in expecting infallibility as to representations of fact. This is the basis of
the transaction. On the other hand, when he employs a business
or professional man to obtain information to guide him in a commercial transaction or when he uses information supplied by such
a person, although employed by some one else, he knows the person supplying the information did so only by reason of his employment. Primarily, such person is employed to render service
112
See Perlman v. Zontendyk, [1934] 5 A. L. R. Cape Prov. Div. 151;
Doyle v. Chatham, (1930) 253 N. Y. 369, 171 N. E. 574; Tardos v. Bozant,

(1846) 1 La. Ann. 199; Nickerson v. Thompson, (1851) 33 Me. 433; Pearson v. Purkett, (1834) 15 Pick. (Mass.) 264.
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rather than to supply information. Competence and care in the
rendition of the service are all that he purports to make available.
Consequently, the person using the information is entitled to expect
only care and diligence to insure its accuracy. This is the situation whether the person who relies on the information resulting
from the other's work is the person who employed him, or whether
he is a stranger to the contract, but one for whom the information
was obtained. In both cases, the reasonable and justifiable expectation is that care and skill have been utilized in the preparation of
the statements made, not that they are correct. Therefore, there
may be a recovery for negligent, but not innocent misrepresentation.
In some cases involving parties to a contract, liability is conditioned on negligence. 11 3 Here, at once, the question is presented
as to the relation of such cases to those involving liability for
innocent misrepresentation as between parties to a contract. Most
of the latter cases are actions between vendor and vendee in which
the representation pertained to the subject of the contract. The
difference between such cases and cases in which the contract
was between a purchaser and an abstractor, or other person whose
business or profession. is primarily one to render service, has
already been indicated. Some cases between vendor and vendee
condition liability on negligence, however, and are therefore inconsistent with those cases which impose liability in such situations
for innocent misrepresentations, 114 unless the matter pertained to a
fact as to which the vendor's position gave him no peculiar means
of knowledge and none was professed."' A fortiori, cases between
vendor and vendee where liability is conditioned upon actual
fraud are inconsistent with those which impose liability for in116
nocent misrepresentations.
113 Atkinson v. Braddock, (1920) 14 Ohio App. 205; Jeter v. Degraff,
(1923) 93 Okla. 76, 219 Pac. 345; Whitehurst v. Life Ins. Co., (1908) 149
N. C. 273, 62 S. E. 1067; Gordan v. Irvine, (1898) 105 Ga. 144. 31 S. E.
151; First Nat'l Bank of Tigerton v. Hecht, (1914) 159 Wis. 113, 149 N. W.
703. 4
11- Hodgkins v. Durham, (1909) 10 Cal. App. 690, 103 Pac. 351; Johnson v. Holdernan, (1917) 30 Idaho 691, 167 Pac. 1030, with which compare Parker v. Herron, (1917) 30 Idaho 327, 164 Pac. 1013; Williams v.
Hume, (1925) 83 Ind. App. 608, 149 N. E. 355, with which compare Maywood Stock Farm v. Pratt, (1915) 60 Ind. App. 131, 110 N. E. 243 and
Anderson v. Evansville Brewery Ass'n, (1912) 49 Ind. App. 403, 97 N. E.
445; Cunningham v. Pease Co., (1908) 74 N. H. 435, 69 Atl. 120.
l1-Pickrell & Craig Co. v. Ballinger-Babbage Co., (1924) 304 Ky. 314,
264 S.-W. 737; Boysen v. Peterson, (1927) 203 Iowa 1073, 211 N. W. 894;
Appleby v. Kurtz, (1931) 212 Iowa 657, 237 N. W. 312.
ll6Tremaine Alfalfa Ranch Co. v. Carmichael, (1927) 32 Ariz. 457, 259
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As to the measure of recovery for a negligent misrepresentation, it would seem that where the defendant is one whose business
or profession it is to furnish information, the interest which the
law is designed to protect is the interest in avoiding loss through
reliance upon the negligently furnished misinformation.
The
recovery, therefore, should not exceed an amount sufficient to
afford compensation for any such loss. This requires the so-called
tort measure of damages. 1

T

Where, however, the defendant is

a vendor who is held liable for a negligently false representation
concerning the article sold, then as in cases involving honest or
dishonest misrepresentations, the defendant may properly be held
to a measure of damages which is equal to the value of the bargain the expectation of which induced the other to complete the
transaction.118
VI.

SITUATIONS

IN WHICH

THE

PLAINTIFF

IS

ENTITLED

TO

RELY ONLY ON THE HONESTY OF THE PERSON MAKING
THE MISREPRESENTATIONS

There are many relations in which the business transaction is
conducted upon the assumption that the parties are honest; otherwise they deal at arm's length. There is no special relationship
between them which makes it proper that one, in giving information to the other, be required to exercise any degree of care to
Pac. 884; Hutchinson v. Gorman, (1903) 71 Ark. 305, 73 S. W. 793, with
which compare Bell v. Fritts, (1923) 161 Ark. 371, 256 S. W. 53; Dwyer
v. Redmond, (1925) 103 Conn. 237, 130 At. 108, with which compare
Elwell v. Rusell, (1899) 71 Conn. 462, 42 Atl. 862, and Schoefield Gear Co.
v. Schoefield, (1898) 71 Conn. 1, 40 At. 1046; Kember v. Young, (C.C.A.
8th Cir. 1905) 137 Fed. 744; Parker v. Herron, (1917) 30 Idaho 327, 164
Pac. 1013; Cantwell v. Harding, (1911) 249 Ill. 354, 94 N. E. 488; Kimball
Bank v. Olsen, (1926) 239 I11.App. 609; Anderson v. Evansville Brewery
Ass'n, (1912) 49 Ind. App. 403. 97 N. E. 445, with which compare Maywood Stock Farm v. Pratt, (1915) 60 Ind. App. 131, 110 N. E. 243 and
Williams v. Hume, (1925) 83 Ind. App. 608, 149 N. E. 355; Live Stock
Co. v. White, (1901) 90 Mo. App. 498, with which compare Devero v.
Sparks, (1915) 189 Mo. App. 500, 176 S. W. 1056; C. W. Denning & Co. v.
Suncrest Co., (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1931) 51 F. (2d) 945.
117Decatur Land, Loan & Abstr. Co. v. Rutland, (Tex. Civ. App. 1916)
185 S. W. 1064; Morin v. Divide County Abstr. Co., (1921) 48 N. D. 214,
183 N. W. 1006; Tardos v. Bozant, (1846) 1 La. Ann. 199. Contra, Pearson v.8 Purkett, (1934) 15 Pick. (Mass.) 264.
" See Long v. Douthitt, (1911) 142 Ky. 42, 134 S. W. 453 (purchase of
stock induced by negligent misrepresentation of director-contract measure
of damages given) ; Spreckels v. Gorrill, (1907) 152 Cal. 383, 92 Pac. 1011
(manager of company by negligent misrepresentation induced plaintiff to
purchase stock-contract measure of damages applied). However, in Williams v. Spazier, (Cal. 1933) 21 P. (2d) 470, where an officer negligently
misrepresented assets of the company, inducing purchase of stock, the tort
measure of damages was applied.
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insure its accuracy or validity. The interests of the parties
ordinarily are adverse. Each is trying, within the limits of the
ethics of business, to make as advantageous a deal as possible.
Each may assurfie that the other will practice on him no conscious
dishonesty, but he can properly expect nothing further. Each must
employ self-protective care and diligence to ascertain the facts
concerning the subject matter of the transaction and must formulate his own judgment thereon. He should not complain if, failing
to do so, he is misled by the other's mistaken information or
erroneous opinion, however unreasonable the mistake may be.
If he chooses to take his adversary's word on a material fact, he
must take it, unless it purports to be more, for an honest, but not
necessarily cautious and certainly not an insured expression of
the other's belief. So too, if he is willing to rely upon the other's
opinion he may take it as a sincere, but certainly not a sound or
unbiased judgment..
(a) Facts. The requirement of fraud, as a necessary element
when the parties are not in contractual relationship and there is no
other reason to expect more than honesty, is quite uniform. Even
when the parties have entered into a contract, neither may be in a
position which would justify the other in expecting assurance of
accuracy or even care or caution to insure it. There are differences
among the courts, however, as to when the relation between the
parties is sufficiently tenuous as to require only honesty. Some
courts impose liability in actions for deceit only when there is
scienter in situations in which other courts appear to impose
liability if there is either scienter or negligence, and still others
-irrespective of scienter and negligence. Most of this confusion
exists in respect to actions by purchasers against vendors. Man),
of the cases of liability for innocent misrepresentation'" and
some of liability for negligence 120 involve situations of this character. At the same time, many cases of conscious misrepresentation are by vendees against vendors. 1'2 When liability is imposed
for intentional or negligent misrepresentation, the apparent inconsistency may to a certain extent be explained by rejecting the
negative pregnant. Because a defendant is liable for intentional
or negligent misrepresentation does not necessarily imply that he
would not have been liable unless there was negligence or fraud.
Liability in such cases may be based upon the a fortiori argument.
""9See the cases in note 36, supra.
"2See the cases in note 114, supra.
"2See the cases in note 116, supra.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

But where recovery by a vendor against a vendee is denied because
of an absence of scienter or negligence, the inconsistency is unavoidable, unless the nature of the thing sold, the circumstances
of the transaction and the business customs in connection therewith subtly account for the different patterns of justifiable assumptions of the parties.
Corresponding to the rule in actions for deceit, in many situations there is no estoppel unless there is actual fraud by the
estoppel denier. Thus, in situations where one party who has
an interest in land fails to disclose the same when another in his
presence enters into a transaction with a third person with respect
thereto in reliance upon the third person's title or interest, the
one is estopped thereafter to assert his inconsistent interest if he
realized the other's mistake.
"Where a man having an interest in property stands by and
sees another man dealing with that property, as owner, with another person who is ignorant of the want of title in the person
with 22whom he is dealing, equity will bind the one who stands
by."1
"The explanation and justification of the estoppel cases depend on the interests involved and the relation existing between
the parties. The value of the plaintiff's interest may be so slight
as compared with the defendant's interest in freedom of action
or non-action that it will be protected only against conscious nisrepresentation. Most of the estoppel cases of standing by are
illustrations. The defendant must know of his ownership and
that the plaintiff is acting or may be expected to act in ignorance
of it."' 23
Thus, there is no estoppel in most cases unless the estoppel
denier knew that he possessed the interest in the land in question.'24 Ignorance by reason of a mistake of law will prevent
the estoppel. 1 5 Indeed, in some cases, it is held that the estoppel
122Mangles v. Dixon, (1852) 3 H. L. C. 702.
123Weisiger, Bases of Liability for Misrepresentation, (1930) 24 I1.
L. Rev. 866, 870. See Saylor v. Kentucky Co., (1924) 205 Ky. 726, 266
S. W. 388, 50 A. L. R. 666; Osborn v. Elder, (1880) 65 Ga. 360; Copeland
v. Copeland, (1848) 28 Me. 525; Brant v. Virginia Coal Co., (1876) 93
U. S. 326, 23 L. Ed. 927; Biddle Boggs v. Merced Min. Co., (1859) 14
Cal. 279; Beechley v. Beechley, (1906) 134 Iowa 75, 108 N. W. 762;
Chellis v. Coble, (1887) 37 Kan. 558, 15 Pac. 505; Burleson v. Burleson,
(1866)24 28 Tex. 383.
' Gallagher v. Conner, (1915) 138 La. 633, 70 So. 539; Burke v.
Adams, (1883) 80 Mo. 504, 50 Am. Rep. 510: Scottish-American Mortg. Co.
v. Bunckley, (1906) 88 Miss. 641, 41 So. 502, 117 Am. St. 763; Watson v.
Vinson, (1915) 108 Miss. 600, 67 So. 61; Harrison v. McReynolds, (1904)
183 Mo. 533, 82 S.W. 120; Week v. Bosworth, (1884) 61 Wis. 78, 20 N. W.
657.
1-"'Smith v. Hutchinson, (1875) 61 Mo. 83; Thompson v. Simpson,
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denier must have intended that the other would be misled by his
failure to disclose his interest, 12 6 although it would seem that it
would be sufficient if he knew that such was substantially certain
to happen. "In all these cases," said the Pennsylvania court,'
"there is some ingredient which would make it a fraud in the party
to insist on his legal right." So too, the Georgia court'28 said,
"We conceive that mere personal silence when an act is about to be
performed affecting rights would be less convincing than an
authority or positive consent to the doing, but neither would
create an estoppel unless fraud was an element;" and in a Maine
case,29 it was said, "the act or declaration of the person must be
wilful, that is, with knowledge of the facts upon which any right
he may have must depend, or with an intention to deceive the
Is
other party."'
(b) Opinions and Comment. If the relation of the parties
does not disclose the defendant to be in a superior position to
formulate a judgment as to the desirability of the transaction
from the plaintiff's point of view, and if no such expressions of
certainty accompany his expression of opinion as reasonably to
induce the plaintiff to believe that he has an adequate factual basis
for his judgment, the plaintiff certainly may not expect infallibility
of judgment. Moreover, if the defendant has not advised the
plaintiff in a professional or business capacity which itself justifies
the plaintiff in expecting a certain professional standard of competence, there is no duty imposed upon the defendant to take precautions to insure the accuracy thereof. If none of these relations is present, the plaintiff, at most, can expect honesty from the
defendant. In these cases, then, the facts are known or available
to both parties. The defendant has-no secret source of knowledge
upon which he founds his opinion. Under such circumstances, the
plaintiff must assume the business risks incident to erroneous judg(1891) 128 N. Y. 270, 28 N. E. 627; Larmont v. Bowly, (1823) 6 Harr. &

J. 500; Petrie v. Reynolds, (1920) 219 S. W. 934; Frederick v. Missouri

River 6Co., (1884) 82 Mo. 402; Holmes v. Crowell, (1875) 73 N. C. 613.
12 Welland Canal Co. v. Hathaway, (1832) 8 Wend. (N.Y.) 480; Carpenter v. Stilwell, (1854) 11 N. Y. 61; Mangusi v. Vigilioti, (1926) 104
Conn. 291, 132 At. 466; Burke v. Adams, (1883) 80 Mo. 504.
127Commonwealth v. Moltz, (1849) 10 Pa. St. 527, 531, 51 Am. Dec.
499, 503.
12"8 sborn v. Elder, (1880) 65 Ga. 360.
" 90 Copeland v. Copeland, (1848) 28 Me. 525.
"3 See also Bigelow v. Topliff, (1853) 25 Vt. 273, 60 Am. Dec. 264;
Cochran v. Harrow, (1859) 22 Ill.
345; Duckwall v. Kisner, (1893) 136 Ind.
99, 35 N. E. 697; Gray v. Crockett, (1886) 35 Kan. 66, 10 Pac. 452; Corbett
v. Norcross, (1857) 35 N. H. 99; Craig v. Crossman, (1920) 209 Mich.
462, 177 N. W. 400.
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ment. If he chooses to rely upon the defendant's judgment as to
the economic wisdom of the transaction, he is justified in expecting no more than honesty of opinion.
But it is not every opinion upon facts known or patent to
both parties that may become the basis for an action even if the
opinion is fraudulently given. The law assumes that everyone is
capable of formulating a valuable judgment upon the ordinary
affairs of life and that if he, in fact, does not determine his conduct according to his own judgment, he ought to do so. In other
words, the individualistic philosophy provides a premise of complete freedom of judgment and action in ordinary affairs. It is
assumed that a purchaser, knowing the facts, is as capable of
formulating an appraisal as to the desirability of the transaction
as his vendor unless there is something about a transaction and
the relation of the parties thereto to make the case unusual. Each
party must rely upon his own judgment. A misrepresentation of
opinion by the other party, even though fraudulent, is inimaterial. "I' This principle finds expression in the dogma that a purchaser may not rely upon the "puffing" or "trade talk" of his
adversary. It is to be noted, however, that these considerations
are pertinent only to the interchange of opinions between antagonistic parties to the bargain. Every one recognizes the known
tendency of parties to a transaction to consummate it on terms
as favorable as possible.13 2 Where, however, an insincere opinion
is offered by one who is a stranger to the deal, the matter is different. Such a person cannot fall back upon the principle of
"puffing," and is held responsible for the honesty of his views. '
13 iBowen, L. J., in Smith v. Land & House Property Co., (1884) I.. R.
28 Ch. D. 7, observed that "The statemcnt of such opinion [on facts equally
known to both parties] is in a sense a statement of a fact, about the condition of a man's own mind, but only of an irrelevant fact, for it is of no
consequence what the opinion is." Compare, also, Campbell, J., in Picard v.
McCormick, (1862) 11 Mich. 68: "If value can be regarded in any case as a
material
fact, then it may be the subject of a warranty."
13 2"The law recognizes the fact that men will naturally overstate the
value and qualities of the articles which they have to sell. All men know
this, and a buyer has no right to rely upon such statements." Morton, C. J.,
in Kimball v. Bangs, (1887) 144 Mass. 321, 11 N. E. 113. And see Rockafellow v. Baker, (1861) 41 Pa. St. 319, 80 Am. Dec. 624; Bishop v. Small,
(1874) 63 Me. 12.
' 33 "And the distinction between the two cases is marked and obvious. In the one, the buyer is aware of his position; he is dealing with the
owner of the property, whose aim is to secure a good price, and whose interest is to put a high estimate upon his estate, and whose great object is
to induce the purchaser to make the purchase; while in the other, the man
who makes the false assertions has apparently no object to gain; he stands
in the situation of a disinterested person, in the light of a friend, who has
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From an apparently disinterested person, the plaintiff may expect

a more literal honesty than from one who, by his insincerity, can
make a profit. When there is no occasion to expect insincerity, the
plaintiff may justifiably expect sincerity.
In some transactions it is recognized that the parties are in a
relation so unique that the general principle is inapplicable even
though they are antagonistic parties.

What ordinarily would be

mere "puffing" or "trade talk" in the usual bargain may on occasion justifiably be taken as a genuine expression of the vendor's
judgment. Common situations of this kind are those in which the
defendant has or holds himself out as having special aptitude or
training in appraising the situation in question."' This is to be
distinguished from cases in which the defendant has special knowledge or means of knowledge of the facts which, were they known
to the plaintiff, might enable him to formulate an accurate judgment. 135 The facts here are known to both parties, but one party
because of unusual experience and training in appraising similar
facts has a recognized advantage. If this advantage is sufficiently
great, there will be a natural tendency of the other to be influenced
by the opinion expressed and the law accordingly recognizes this
tendency by requiring honesty of the defendant.
"It is a matter of every day occurrence," said the Michigan
court,"16 "to find various grades of manufactured articles known
more generally by their prices than by any test of their quality
which can be furnished by ordinary inspection. .

.

. In the case

before us the alleged fraud consisted of false statements of a
jeweler to an unskilled purchaser of the value of articles which
none but an expert could be reasonably supposed to understand.
The dealer knew of the purchaser's ignorance and deliberately and
designedly availed himself of it to defraud him."
This situation is also to be distinguished from those in which
the defendant offers an opinion in his capacity as a business or
no motive or intention to depart from the truth, and who thus throws the
vendee off his guard, and exposes him to be misled by the deceitful misrepresentations." Hubbard, J., in Medbury v. Watson. (1843) 6 .Metc.
(Mass.) 246, 39 Am. Dec. 726. And see Busterud v. Farrington, (1887)
36 Minn. 320, 31 N. W. 360; Kenner v. Harding, (1877) 85 Ill. 264. 28
Am. Rep. 615; Restatement of Torts, Tentative Draft, No. 13, sec. 619:
234 Simar v. Canady, (1873) 53 N. Y. 298; Manley v. Felty, (1896) 146
Ind. 194; Leonard v. Springer, (1902) 197 Ill. 532; Picard v. McCormick,
(1862) 11 Mich. 68; Andrews v..Jackson, (1897) 168 Mass. 266, 47 N. E.
412, 60 Am. St. Rep. 390; Bradbury v. Haines, (1880) 60 N. H. 123;
Estell v. Myers, (1876) 54 Miss. 174. See Restatement of Torts, Tentative Draft No. 13, sec. 618.
"35See supra, p. 974.
136Picard v. McCormick, (1862) 11 Mich. 68, per Campbell, J.
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professional man engaged in furnishing advice to third persons
in connection with transactions to which he is not otherwise a
party. In such a case, the person to whom the advice is given
may expect more than honesty; he may expect a reasonable competency and skill.1 3 7 If, however, a specialist or an expert is
himself a party to the transaction with the plaintiff, his capacity as
an antagonistic party replaces that of one whose business it is to
furnish information for others and he is not held to a standard
of professional competency. He is held only to a standard of
common honesty.
Again, what is ordinarily mere "trade talk" may properly become the basis for reliance by one who bears to such person a
relation of trust and confidence in respects other than the transaction in question.138 Persons who deal with members of their
immediate family do not adopt the ordinary business attitude employed in transactions with strangers. This is also true as between
persons who have long been associated together in other business connections. It may be true because of mutual membership
in social, religious, or other organizations.1 9 In short, whenever
the parties to a transaction have been so associated in other relations that in their dealings with each other they may be expected
to drop the business precautions and defenses, neither will be
permitted to take advantage of such relations and, by abusing the
confidence thus recognized, consummate an advantageous transaction by misrepresentation of opinion.
Here, again, statements of law are illustrative. If the facts
are known to the parties, a fraudulent opinion as to the law pertaining thereto is not actionable as a tort unless the relation of
the parties is so unusual as to justify reliance thereon, 140 as
where the person expressing the opinion is a lawyer, or other
person of special knowledge,"' or is in a relation of trust or
'13 7See supra, p. 986.

3SBeare v. Wright, (1905) 14 N. D. 26; Yeoman v. Lasley, (1883) 40
Ohio St. 190; Hughes v. Lockington, (1906) 221 Ill. 571, 77 N. E. 1105;
Mattauch v. Walsh Bros., (1907) 136 Iowa 225, 113 N. W. 818.
39See especially Comment c, sec. 619, Restatement of Torts, Tentative
Draft No. 13.
140 Gormely v. Gymnastic Ass'n, (1882) 55 Wis. 350, 13 N. W. 242;
Fry v. Day, (1884) 97 Ind. 348; Thompson v. Phoenix Ins. Co., (1883)
75 Me. 55, 46 Am. Rep. 357; Bilafskylv. Conveyancers' Title Ins. Co.,
(1906) 192 Mass. 504, 78 N. E. 534; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Phinney,
(1900) 178 U. S. 327, 20 Sup. Ct. 906, 44 L. Ed. 1088; Hoptowit v. Brown,
(1921)41 115 Wash. 661, 198 Pac. 370.
' Allison v. Doerflinger Co., (1932) 208 Wis. 70, 242 N. W. 558;
Ellis v. Gordon, (1930) 202 Wis. 134, 231 N. W. 585; Hoptowit v. Brown,
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confidence. 14 2 Thus, in Gornley v. Gymnastic Ass'n, 4 3 where a
lessor had fraudulently told the lessee that he had a license which
would enable the lessee to sell liquor on the leased premises, the
court said: "The appellant (plaintiff) was just as much bound
to know that the license of the respondent would not protect him in
the sale of liquors, etc., as the respondent was. It was a question
of law whether such licenses would protect the appellant, and a
false or mistaken misrepresentation as to what the law is upon an
admitted state of facts is no basis of an action, especially where
there are no confidential relations between the parties." As a
matter of fact, the defendant in this case did not himself have the
license which he claimed to have. This, of course, was a nisrepresentation of fact but an immaterial one, "for the reason that
if it had been true it would not have protected the appellant from
the consequences which followed." If the opinion as to the law
had been accurate on the stated facts, the falsity of the facts
would have made the statement actionable since the fraudulent
statement of fact rather than the statement of law would have
4
been the basis of the deceit.'
In Jekslizwitz v. Groswald, 14 howvever, the defendant was held
liable for fraudulently representing to the plaintiff that certain
formalities constituted a valid marriage, thus inducing the plaintiff
to live with him as his wife. The plaintiff was a woman of foreign
birth, ignorant of the laws and customs of this country, which
ignorance the defendant utilized to perpetrate the fraud. Said
the court:
"The defendant occupied a relation of trust and confidence
toward the plaintiff because of their engagement to marry and
was bound to act fairly and in good faith in his dealings with
her.1 6 When a party occupies such a relation his misrepresentations of law may be actionable. The party with whom, because of
that relation, he had the duty to deal fairly, would have a right to
rely and act upon such representations if believed without negligence.1 47 Misstatements of law may also be a ground of liability
(1921) 115 Wash. 661, 198 Pac. 370; Jekshewitz v. Groswald. (1929) 265
Mass. 413, 164 N. E. 609; Whitehurst v. Life Ins. Co., (1908) 149 N. C.
273, 62
S. E. 1067.
142jekshewitz v. Groswald, (1929) 265 Mass. 413, 164 N. E. 609; EastonTaylor Trust Co. v. Loker, (Mo. App. 1908) -205 S. W. 87; Busicre v.

Reilly, (1905) 189 Mfass. 518, 75 N. E. 958.

143(1882)
55 Wis. 350, 13 N. W. 242.
144Fainardi v. Pausata, (1924) 45 R. I. 462, 126 At. 865.
145(1929) 265 Mass. 413, 164 N. E. 609.
146The court here cited Eaton v. Eaton, (1919) 233 Mass. 351, 371. 124
N. E. 37, 5 A. L. R. 1426; Wellington v. Rugg, (1922) 243 Mass. 30, 35.

136 N.47 E. 831.

1 The court here cited Lewis v. Corbin, (1907)
N. E. 248, 122 Am. St. Rep. 261.

195 Mass. 520. 81
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if a party possessed of superior knowledge takes advantage of
the ignorance of the other to deceive him by such misstatements."""8
Liability for the fraudulent expression of an opinion as to
the legal effects of certain facts is thus identical with liability for
the expression of any other judgment upon known facts.'49
There is, it seems, a different rule as to restitution. Although
there are cases which impose the same requirements to a recovery
by the vendee of the amount paid for the land,"' ° the modern
view imposes the duty of restitution in every case of a conscious
misrepresentation of law irrespective of any confidential relationship between the parties."' This may be explained on the
ground that, even though the plaintiff was not justified in relying
on the defendant's opinion as to the application of the law to the
known facts, the unjust enrichment of the vendor at the vendee's
expense, resulting, as it does, from the vendor's fraud, is so
unconscionable as to require the interposition of the law. '[he
plaintiff may not be permitted to enforce the bargain as made
because he was not justified in expecting an honest basis for
dealing. He will be permitted to repudiate the whole transaction,
however, because of the policy that it is better to protect an inconpetent and foolish person than to encourage an unscrupulous and
dishonest one. Moreover, there is authority that restitution is
available even for an innocent misrepresentation of law if a con148The court here cited Rosenberg v. Doe, (1889) 148 Mass. 560. 20
N. E. 176; Busiere v. Reilly, (1905) 189 Mass. 518, 75 N. E. 958; lsliem
Security Corp., (1926) 255 Mass. 29, 32, 150 N. E. 846.
v. Massachusetts
49
"If the representation as to a matter of law is a representation of
1
opinion as to the legal consequences of facts known to the maker and the
recipient or assumed by both to exist, the recipient is justified in relying
upon it to the same extent as though it were a representation of any other
opinion." Restatement of Torts, Tentative Draft No. 13, sec. 621 (2).
15°Baird v. Publisher's Service Bur., (1824) 51 N. D. 374, 199 N. W.
757; Drake v. Latham, (1869) 59 Il. 270; Morel v. Masolaski, (1928) 333
41, 164 N. E. 205; Thompson v. Phoenix Ins. Co., (1883) 75 Me. 55;
Ill.
Massey v. Public Service Co., (1928) 196 N. C. 299, 145 S.E. 561; Nichols
& Shepard Co. v. Horstad, (1906) 21 S. D. 80, 109 N. W. 509; Louchbeim v. Gill, (1861) 17 Ind. 139; Tradesman Co. v. Superior, etc., Co.,
(1907) 147 Mich. 702, 111 N. W. 343.
151"A person who has conferred a benefit upon another induced thereto
by a mistake of law, is entitled to restitution thereof if his mistake was
caused by reliance upon a fraudulent misrepresentation of law by the other."
Restatement of Restitution, sec. 55 (a).
To support this statement, the Reporter cites (Explanatory Notes, pp.
69-72) many cases which he regards as misrepresentations of law, but in
which rescission was allowed by the court on the ground that they were
misrepresentations of fact and other cases in which restitution was allowed
because of inequitable dealing by one of the parties.
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fidential relation between the parties made reliance thereon justi15 2
fiable.
Honesty, but honesty alone, can be expected in representations
of title to land or other legal right by a layman who has no special
knowledge upon facts unknown although readily discoverable by
the plaintiff,51 3 misstatements of the amount or quantity of the
land, chattels or other things which are the subject of the transaction, and the estimated cost of operation or upkeep of the land
or other article in question."" If the plaintiff desires verification,
he can obtain it, for the facts are accessible. If title to land is
involved, he can procure the services of an attorney or an abstractor; if the quantity of land is in question, he can procure
the services of a surveyor. Even then, he will be entitled to
expect only reasonable care and competence to make the information accurate. If he wants insurance, he must buy it as such,
either from the vendor or from a third person." But from his
vendor, the purchaser is justified in expecting only honesty as to
such representations.
In the case of a sale of goods or intangibles, this rule is inapplicable, for the reason that the purchaser will ordinarily have
no way of determining the seller's title, the pertinent facts of which
are usually known only to the latter. For this reason the implied
52
1 "A person who has conferred a benefit upon another induced thereto by a mistake of law, is entitled to restitution thereof if his mistake was

caused by . . . justifiable reliance upon an innocent misrepresentation of

law by the other." Restatement of Restitution, sec. 55 (b).
See Engelbrecht v. Engelbrecht, (1926) 323 I11. 208, 153 N. E. 827;
Wheeler v. Smith, (1850) 9 How. (U.S.) 55, 13 L. Ed. 44; Altgelt v.
Gerbic,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1912) 149 S. W. 233.
' 53 First Nat'l Bank v. Schirmer, (1916) 134 Minn. 387, 159 N. XV. 800;
McGary v. Campbell, (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) 245 S. W. 106; Gerard v.
Jery, (1921) 95 Vt. 29, 113 At1. 533; McDonald v. Smith, (1910) 95 Ark.
523, 130 S. W. 515; Prest v. Adams, (1927) 142 Wash. 111. 252 Pac. 686;
Citizens Bank v. Dodson, (1929) 231 Ky. 660, 21 S. XV. (2d) 1019; Bondurant v. Raven Coal Co., (Mo. App. 1929) 25 S. W. (2d) 566; Brady v.
Edwards, (1901) 35 Misc. Rep. 435, 71 N. Y. S. 972; Rogan v. Illinois
Trust, etc., Bank, (1901) 93 Ill. App. 39; Metzger v. Baker, (1933) 93
Colo. 165, 24 P. (2d) 748; Curtley v. Security Say. Soc. (1907) 46 Wash.
50, 89 Pac. 180; Rollins v. Quimby, (1908) 200 Mass. 162, 86 N. E. 350;
Riley v. Bell, (1903) 120 Iowa 618, 95 N. W. 170; Hunt v. Barker, (1900)
22 R.54I. 18, 46 AtI. 46.
1 Sorrells v. Clifford, (1922) 23 Ariz. 448, 204 Pac. 1013; Emerson v.
Hutchinson, (1895) 63 111. App. 203; Boston Consol. Gas Co. v. Folsom,
(1921)

237 Mass. 565, 130 N. E. 197; State Trust, etc., Bank v.'Hermona

Land, etc., Co., (1925) 30 N. M. 566, 240 Pac. 469; Texas Farm Bureau v.
Craddock, (Tex. Civ. App. 1926) 285 S. W. 949; Coe v. Ware, (1930) 71
Mass. 570, 171 N. E. 732.
' 5IHere, again, there is support for the view that there may be restitution even though the misrepresentation of title was innocent if there
was justifiable reliance thereon. Restatement of Restitution, sec. 47 (2) (e).
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warranty of title is applicable thereto."' If the seller accurately
states the facts upon which his purported interest depends, there
will be, of course, no implication of warranty, and the negotiations
will proceed on the basis only of the seller's honesty in asserting
that the stated facts support his claims of title, the risk of its
failure thus falling to the purchaser.
(c) Measure of Damages. As to the extent of recovery in
cases of liability for conscious misrepresentation, there seems to
be some justification for variation. If the liability is based upon
a situation which would properly support liability for an innocent
representation, it is clear that the same measure of damages should
be awarded.117 If the plaintiff would have been entitled to recover
had he not proved scienter and if such recovery would have
entitled him to damages based upon the expectable advantage of
the contract which he thought he was making, certainly he should
not receive less because he went further than was necessary and
established actual fraud. If, however, the case is not one in which
he could have recovered for an innocent misstatement, he may
well be limited to a recovery of his actual out-of-pocket loss. In
the latter case, the plaintiff's recovery is not based upon a situation which gave him the right to expect absolute accuracy, and,
therefore, he is in no position to demand that he be put in the
position which he would have occupied had the facts been as he
properly supposed they must be. His recovery is based only
upon his right to expect honesty. Therefore, he can properly
receive no more than is sufficient to put him in the position which
he would have occupied had the defendant been honest. If the
defendant had been honest, he would not have made the false
statement and the plaintiff would not have entered the transaction.
His recovery, accordingly, may properly be limited to the loss
suffered by reliance on the dishonest misrepresentations. A
specious reason to justify the contract measure of damages in the
normal case in which this measure exceeds the tort measure is
the deterrent effect of the greater recovery. This, however, is an
indirect way of imposing punitive damages. When a rule of
15rSee Restatement of Restitution, sec. 52 (1).
1n the following cases the same measure of damages was applied to
situations of intentional misrepresentation as was applied in situations of innocent misrepresentations: Dittcher v. Binkley, (1933) 251 Ky. 134, 64 S. W.
(2d) 502 (conscious misrepresentation) ; Exchange Bank v. Gaitskill, (1896)
18 Ky. L. Rep. 532, 37 S. W. 160 (innocent misrepresentation) ; Ritko v.
Grove, (1907) 102 Minn. 312, 113 N. W. 629 (conscious misrepresentation);
Freeman v. Harbough, (1911) 114 Minn. 283, 130 N. W. 1110 (innocent
misrepresentation).
1 57
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damages performs a quasi-ounitive function, it seems desirable, in
the interest of clarifying issues of policy, that it be frankly designated and classified as such rather than appear as a rule of
compensation.
VII. SITUATIONS IN WHICH THE PLAINTIFF Is

NOT ENTITLED

TO RELY EVEN ON HONESTY OF PERSON MAKING
MISREPRESENTATIONS

There 'are, in general, two types of statements which a party
to a transaction must discount completely. He is not permitted by
the law to place any significance whatever thereon. He is not
justified in expecting accuracy, care or even honesty and sincerity.
One type of statement is a representation of immaterial fact. The
other is the representation, upon known facts, of the opinion of
an adverse party who is not, by reason of special knowledge and
skill, in a recognizably special position to formulate a judgment.
In some instances, the latter type of statement is treated like the
first-an immaterial representation. It is of no moment what
such an adversary thinks of the desirability of the transaction for
the plaintiff, and therefore it is of no significance that such a
misrepresentation is insincere and invalid. The plaintiff must
formulate his own opinion and be guided thereby.
(a) Facts. The justifiability of reliance even upon the defendant's honesty is limited by the rule, applied in all jurisdictions,
of materiality. A fraudulent misrepresentation is not actionable
if the fact or facts misrepresented are not material.'"" Trivial
misstatements, even though fraudulently made, are not actionable.
The misrepresentation "like poison" must "taint" the transaction."'
Materiality is important in two respects. In the first place,
it is significant on the question of the plaintiff's actual reliance
on the misrepresentation, for, of course, if the misstatement did
not in fact induce action, there can be no recovery on grounds of
lack of causation.161 If the fact misrepresented is insignificant,
258Dawe v. Morris, (1889) 149 Mass. 188; Arnold v. Somers, (1918)
92 Vt. 512, 105 AtI. 260; Palmer v. Bell, (1893) 85 Me. 352, 27 Atl. 250;
Acker v. Warden, (1891) 47 Kan. 51, 27 Pac. 102; Stufflebean v. Peaveler.
(Mo. App. 1925) 274 S. W. 926; Smith v. Chadwick, (1882) 20 Ch. D.
27; Curtiss v. Howell, (1868) 39 N. Y. 211; Hall v. Johnson. (1879) 41
Mich. 286; Caswell v. Hunton, (1895) 87 Me. 277, 32 At. 899; Messer v.
Smyth, (1879) 59 N. H. 41; Jordan & Sons v. Pickett, (1884) 78 Ala. 331;
Clark5 v. Everhart, (1869) 63 Pa. St. 347.
'2 Clark v. Everhart, (1869) 63 Pa. St. 347, 349.
16oAddington v. Allen, (1833) 11 Wend. (N.Y.) 374; Marshall v. Gilman, (1892) 52 M{inn. 88; Shaw v. Gilbert, (1901) 111 Wis. 165, 86 N. W.
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there will ordinarily be no reliance thereon. "It may be that the
misstatement is trivial," said the Master of the Rolls in Smith v.
Chadzedck, '1l "so trivial that the court will be of opinion that it
could not have affected the plaintiff's mind at all, or induced
him to enter into the contract." On the question of actual reliance
or causation, therefore, materiality is important as matter of
evidence.
It seems, however, that courts have attached legal significance
to it otherwise than as mere evidence whether the plaintiff was in
fact misled.
"False representations, no matter how acted upon, will not be
sufficient to set aside an agreement, otherwise valid, unless they
Immaterial representations, whether true or
were material.
false, cannot be made the basis of relief, even though coupled
with the assertion that they were relied upon."'162
Here again, practical considerations prevail. A representation
is material if the "existence or non-existence [of the fact misrepresented] is a matter to which a reasonable man would attach
importance in determining his choice of action" in the transaction
in question.1 63 The rule requiring materiality does not reflect a
policy to punish the imprudent nor to require the injudicious to
suffer his own loss because of his eccentricity in relying upon statements to which ordinary men would not attach significance. The
rule is merely another compromise with expediency. Administrative necessity requires it. Because it is impossible to demonstrate
with exactness the factors which impelled the plaintiff, arbitrary
limits are set. It is the same difficulty which inheres in all
problems which require judgment on human conduct on the basis
of psychological and ethical standards. Appraisal in such terms
necessarily involves a wide margin of error. Administration of
such standards is a baffling process and, in sheer desperation,
courts resolve a technique studded with rules of thumb based on
probabilities as determined by experience, itself marshalled with
unscientific inexactitude. This is practical only in the sense that
188; Wegefarth v. Wiessner, (1919) 134 Md. 555, 107 Atd. 364, 6 A. L. R.
396; Bartnett v. Handy, (1923) 243 Mass. 446, 142 N. E. 84: Bowman v.
Carithers, (1872) 40 Ind. 90; Allen v. Pendarvis, (1916) 60 Okla. 216, 159
Pac. 1117; Maxwell Ice Co. v. Brackett, Shaw & Lunt Co., (1921) 80 N. Ff.
236, 116 Atl. 34; Proctor v. McCoid, (1882) 60 Iowa 153, 14 N. W. 208;
Hagee v. Grossman, (1869) 31 Ind. 223; Allen v. Truesdell, (1883) 135
Mass. 75.
161(1882) 20 Ch. D. 27, 45.
6-2Hall v. Johnson, (1879) 41 Mich. 286, 2 N. W. 55,. 57.
163Restatement of Torts, Tentative Draft No. 13, sec. 614 (a).
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any alternative is equally or more unconvincnig. There is comfort derived from the feeling that, in some vague way, justice
and fairness will be attained in the great bulk of cases although
in any particular case there may be unfortunate results.
Thus, an objective materiality is required on the theory that,
in the large, any other kind will be statistically negligible and
too shadowy to recognize.
"Anything short of this would be unsafe, and would render
it exceedingly dangerous for parties to conduct the ordinary
business transactions of the day. It frequently happens that
representations are made, while negotiations are pending, not
strictly true. They may relate to the subject matter, or have little
or no reference thereto. Neither party may place the slightest
reliance thereon, yet, should a dispute thereafter arise, how easy
for the person who imagined he was injured to assert that he
relied upon the representations made-believed them to be trueand, so believing, was thereby induced to make the contract in
dispute. It would, indeed, be difficult to disprove such an assertion, if the materiality of the representations formed no part of
The fraud must therefore be material to the transthe inquiry.
64
action."1
There is a further policy involved in requiring the fact misrepresented to be such that a reasonable man would regard it as
important. Because of the social interest in the security of transactions, allowance may very well be made for the known tendency
of most men for casual and loose talk. The rule requiring materiality in actions based even upon fraudulent misrepresentations
is consistent with the rule of warranty in an action based upon
innocent misrepresentations. Both serve well the policy of nonimpairment of bargains. In the case of a sale, the warrantor is
held to the bargain as made. In the case of deceit or fraud, the
main outlines of the bargain stand while the law ignores the vocal
by-play, even though fraudulently and effectively indulged. What
is ordinaiily regarded as a bargain stands according to its terms
and is enforced, even though the defendant was the innocent -"ctim
of mistake. So too, it stands as made notwithstanding fraudulent
side talk of a different tenor. The vendee may enforce the material aspects of the deal against an innocent vendor; he cannot
enforce the trivial details of it against a fraudulent one.
(b) Opinion and Coinnent. "But, lest there be mistake about
it caveat emptor is not yet a historical doctrine. The course of
legal events has merely reduced its rule to a constitutional mon164Hall v. Johnson, (1876)

41 Mich. 286, 2 N. W. 55, 57, 58.
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archy. The precept is still to be discovered behind enlarged rules
of deceit, warranty and negligence, behind established tests, inspection and trade practice. The protection accorded the buyer
is as yet neither broad nor certain. At best only a minimum of
quality is assured and that in matters which do not invite great
difference in opinion. Business is business and law is law, but
neither insures quality to the book, long life to the garment, style
to the furniture, or durability to the automobile."'""
Thus, the "puffing" opinion of the vendor is still to be discounted by the purchaser. He is not yet permitted implicitly to
rely upon the honesty of his vendor's judgment as to quality.
utility, durability, and other attributes which constitute value.
To be sure, as the extravagance of the vendor's opinion decreases,
the closer to the line of justifiable reliance do the parties approach.
A slight variance from a truthful representation of opinion is
not tolerated so much as a wide one, because it is more dishonest.
"Dealer's talk" carries its own label. To this the purchaser must
close his legal ears. The goods are "puffed" as a matter of business practice and technique, with perhaps a more or less vague
expectation that the psychological effect upon the "prospect" will
be favorable. It is only half serious, however. Extravagant claims
for commodities on the part of the vendor are not regarded in tile
business world as unethical. The rules of the game permit such
claims, because they are not intended to be taken seriously or
literally.
A statement that a cigarette is made from the purest tobaccos
grown, that an automobile is the most economical car on the market, that a stock is the safest investment in the world, that a
machine is 100 per cent efficient, that a household device is
absolutely perfect, that a real estate investment will insure a handsome profit, that an article is the greatest bargain ever offered,
and similar claims are intended and understood to be merely elphatic methods of urging a sale.' " These statements are not
lSHamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, (1931) 40 Yale L.
J. 1133, 1187.
166Vulcan Metals Co. v. Simmons Mfg. Co., (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1918) 248
Fed. 853, cert. den. in 247 U. S. 507, 38 Sup. Ct. 427, 62 L. Ed. 1241
(vendor said his machine was absolutely perfect and worked with the
greatest efficiency) ; Schwitters v. Des Moines Commercial College, (1925)
199 Iowa 1058, 203 N. W. 265 (owner of business college told plaintiff, a
prospective student, that she could complete the course and obtain a position in eight weeks' time); Prince v. Brackett, Shaw & Lunt Co., (1925)
125 Me. 31, 130 At. 509 (vendor, in selling a machine to plaintiff, said, "We
unreservedly claim that this is the best sawmill power on the American
market today"); Kulesga v. Wyhowski, (1921) 213 Mich. 189, 182 N. W.
53 (defendant told plaintiffs that if they would invest in certain timber
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designed to affect the intellect. The effect is largely hypnotic. It
is merely an accepted technique for urging the prospect to close
the deal. These things, then, the buyer must disregard in forming a sober judgment as to his conduct in the transaction. If he
succumbs to such persistent solicitation, he must take the risk of
any loss attributable to a dispirity between the exaggerated opinion
of the purchaser and a reasonable or an accurate judgment of the
value of the article. "The law recognizes the fact that men will
naturally overstate the value and qualities of the articles which
they have to sell. All men know this, and a buyer has no right
to rely upon such statements. 1 67
In this area of business activity, caveat emptor still prevails.
The area is bounded, first, by an equal availability of the essential
facts upon which judgment depends; second, a substantial equality
of ability to formulate a judgment on the known or available facts;
third, the existence of the common psychological defenses which
ordinarily exist against persuasion in business transactions; fourth,
a limitation to statements which are judgments incapable of complete verification save as to their reasonableness, mere appraisals
of existing facts. Within this area, a catch-as-catch-can struggle
is permitted. Anything goes. The boundaries to this area are
obviously somewhat vague and nebulous, and it is for this reason
that uncertainty and apparent confusion exist in the decisions.
It is, of course, impossible to reconcile many of the decisions
holding that exaggerated opinions are mere "dealer's talk," and
many decisions holding similar expressions sufficient to justify
reliance upon the honesty of the defendant. It is submitted, however, that the inconsistencies may be less than appearances would
indicate. Judicial reactions to a situation may depend upon many
lands, they would make several thousand dollars profit) ; Nichols v. Lane,
(1919) 93 Vt. 87, 106 At. 592 (defendant vendor not liable for saying
there was "no better land in Vermont") ; Gleason v. McPherson, (1917)
175 Cal. 594, 166 Pac. 332 (vendor said that money invested in bonds would
be safe, and that they were "giltedge") ; Thorpe v. Cooley, (1917) 138
Minn. 431, 165 N. W. 265 (statement by vendor that bonds were as good as
gold) ; Herrill v. Rugg, (1931) 114 Cal. App. 492, 300 Pac. 140 (representation by vendor that uncompleted houses in tract were worth $500 more than
was paid for them); Shine v. Dodge, (1931) 130 Me. 440, 157 At. 318
(vendor of stock told plaintiff purchaser that stock wvas worth more than
$15,000, that corporation was sound financially, that its stock wvas a good investment) ; Jewell v. Shell Oil Co., (1933) 172 Wash. 603, 21 P. (2d) 243
(vendor told plaintiff he would make a certain amount of profit from the
filling station); Wilson v. Municipal Bond Co., (Cal. App. 1935) 42 P.
(2d) 1047 (broker told landowner, in order to induce exchange, that bonds
were worth 100 cents on the dollar).
167 Kimble v. Bangs, (1887) 144 Mass. 321, 11 X. E. 113.
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factors which are incapable of reproduction in the printed report.
MkIuch latitude should be allowed the trial judge who may pass
judgment upon the justifiable character of the plaintiff's reliance
in the light of many intangible factors which, while difficult to
catch with a word, are nevertheless real in that people are in
fact frequently influenced thereby. This has led to the suggestion
that if, in the particular case, the vendor succeeds in an effort to
win the confidence of the purchaser, he should be held to the
honesty of his opinion even though it pertains to the value or
quality of an article open to examination and, therefore, as
readily subject to the appraisal of the vendee as to that of the
vendor.'"" In other words, "puffing" ceases to be such if the
defendant intends it to be taken seriously and literally and is successful in inducing the vendee so to take it. If the parties actually
deal on the strenth of the honesty of the vendor's judgment, he
will be held thereto.
This position is undoubtedly supported by the ethics of the
situation, but until the moral atmosphere of business itself is
cleared, there is much reason to expect the law to take into account
the assumptions that underlie the normal business transaction, that
the vendor's or manufacturer's tall talk concerning the superior
quality of his commodity must be verified by experience on the
part of the consumer. The vendee in the ordinary transaction
must rely upon his own judgnient in a capitalistic regime.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This study represents an attempt to discover a rationalizing
medium for the various segments of the law of misrepresentation.
It is necessarily incomplete in that every rule of law concerning
misrepresentation is not considered. It is also imperfect in that
the synthesis does not disclose completely harmonious patterns of
policy. It is submitted, however, that in the light of the rational
structure set up many of the inconsistencies in the law are dissolved
into a not altogether unpalatable potion. Behind the technicalities
of deceit, estoppel, warranty, negligence, etc., there emerges a
certain coherence in policies that have their roots deeply imbedded
in community-wide assumptions in connection with business prac168"The recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation of the maker's opinion upon facts known to the recipient is not justified in relying thereon in
a transaction with the maker unless the opinion is material and the maker
• . . has successfully endeavored to secure the confidence of the recipient."
Restatement of Torts, Tentative Draft No. 13, sec. 618.
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tice and ethics that make the net results relatively fair. These
tacit notions of the implied rules of the business game constitute
the inarticulate premises of the law. No critical appraisal is
adequate without taking them into account as factors of primary,
if not principal importance. To the extent to which the law conforms thereto does it accomplish its purpose as a means to an end.

